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BEING-SAID-OF IN ARISTOTLE'S *CATEGORIES*

The ontology of the *Categories* relies on several fundamental relations that obtain between beings. One of these is the relation of being-said-of. The most widespread view among commentators is that the relation of being-said-of amounts to essential predication.

After drawing attention to some relatively neglected textual evidence that tells against such an interpretation, I explore a different account of the relation of being-said-of. On this alternative picture, while the relation of being-said-of is essential predication when it obtains between universals, it coincides with mere predication when it obtains between a universal and an individual. The relation of being-said-of turns out to be closely linked with paronymy: in most (but not all) cases where a property (e.g. generosity) is in an individual, a paronymous universal (e.g. generous) is said of that individual. Also the alternative picture faces difficulties, however. In conclusion, it remains unclear what position, if any, can be coherently attributed to Aristotle¹.

1. Aristotle's expressions for ontological relations in the *Categories*

Three fundamental relations and their Aristotelian formulations

Three two-place relations play important roles in the ontology of the *Categories*: being SAID OF, being IN, and HOLDING of². Each of these three relations obtains between

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² I capitalize the expressions that stand for the three relations in order to indicate that they are technical terms (cf. F.A. LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, pp. 53 ff.; W.-R. MANN, *The Discovery of Things: Aristotle's Categories and Their Context*, Princeton University Press, Princeton [NJ] 2000, pp. 23 ff.; C. PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 33 [2007], pp. 125-144, in part. pp. 125-126). The passages where these relations are discussed or mentioned are: *Cat.* 2, 1 a 20-b 9; 3, 1 b 10-24; 5, 2 a 11-b 6; 2 b 15-17; 3 a 7-b 9; 8, 9 b 22-24; 10, 11 b 38-12 a 17 (>T 5); 12 a 26-b 5 (> T 6); 12 b 27-35; 11, 14 a 15-18; *Top.* 4.5, 126 a 3-16; 6, 127 b 1-4; 5.4, 132 b 19-34; *Phys.* 4.3, 210 a 20-21; b 24-27; *Metaph.* Δ 8, 1017 b 13-14; 23, 1023 a 11-13; a 23-25. Other passages address connected issues: *An. Pr.* 1.34, 47 b 40-48 a 23; 36, 48 a 40-b 27; *Top.* 2.1, 109 a 10-26 (> T 10); 4, 111 a 33-b 11. At *Int.* 3, 16 b 10-11 three readings are available: (i) Minio-Paluello and Weidemann read 'ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σημειῶν ἐστίν, οἷον

things in the world (it is not restricted to obtaining between linguistic expressions and things in the world).

In the *Categories*, the relation of being SAID OF is expressed mainly by verb-phrases like ‘to be said of a subject’ (‘λέγεσθαι καθ’ ὑποκειμένου’ + gen.) or ‘to be said of’ (‘λέγεσθαι κατά’ + gen.)³. The relation of being IN is expressed by verb-phrases like ‘to be in a subject’ (‘εἶναι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ’ + dat.) or ‘to be in’ (‘εἶναι ἐν’ + dat.)⁴. Finally, the relation of HOLDING OF is expressed by the verb-phrase ‘to hold of’ (‘ὑπάρχειν’ + dat.). The relation of HOLDING OF obtains in all (though, probably, not only) those cases in which one of the other two does: if *x* is either SAID OF or IN *y*, then *x* HOLDS OF *y*⁵.

The verb-phrases ‘to be predicated of a subject’ and ‘to be predicated of’

Other verb-phrases that play an important role in the *Categories* are ‘to be predicated as of a subject’ (‘κατηγορεῖσθαι ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου κατά’ + gen.) and ‘to be predicated of’ (‘κατηγορεῖσθαι κατά’ or ‘κατηγορεῖσθαι’ + gen.). They have two main uses. On the first, they express a relation that obtains between things in the world (they are *not* restricted to obtaining between linguistic expressions and things in the world)⁶. On their second use, the verb-phrases from the ‘to be predicated’-group express that relation which obtains between a name or the *definiens* of a definition, on the one hand, and every item to which it applies on the other. Since names and *definiens* of definitions are linguistic expressions, the second use does restrict the relation to obtaining between linguistic expressions and things in the world⁷.

τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου’ (which, according to Ammon. *in Int.* 50, 8-11, was the text of Porphyry); (ii) two of the main MSS, Pacius, Buhle, and Weise read ‘ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημειῶν ἔστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων’; (iii) most of the main MSS, Bekker, Waitz, Dübner, Cooke, Colli, Apostle, Montanari, and Zadro have ‘ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημειῶν ἔστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ’. I opt for reading (iii), but I cannot discuss here the reasons for this choice – let me merely point out that it is authoritatively attested and that its terminology (‘λέγεσθαι καθ’ ὑποκειμένου’ + gen. vs ‘λέγεσθαι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ’ + dat.) fits with that used to express the contrast between being SAID OF and being IN at *Top.* 4.6, 127 b 1-4 (cf. below, fn. 4; E. MONTANARI, *La sezione linguistica del Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele*, Università degli Studi di Firenze - Dipartimento di Scienze dell’ Antichità “Giorgio Pasquali”, Firenze 1984-1988, II, pp. 196-197).

³ *Cat.* 2, 1 a 21-22; 5, 3 a 26-27; etc.

⁴ *Cat.* 2, 1 a 21-22; 5, 3 a 12-13; a 1 4-15; etc. In the *Topics* the relation of being IN is sometimes expressed by ‘λέγεσθαι ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ’ + dat. (4.6, 127 b 1-2; 5.4, 132 b 20; b 24-5 [v.l.]). The converse of the relation of being IN is sometimes expressed by ‘to have’ (‘ἔχειν’) (*Cat.* 15, 15 b 17-21; *Phys.* 3.3, 202 a 28-31; *Metaph.* Δ 23, 1023 a 11-13; a 24-25 – cf. A. CODE, *Aristotle: Essence and Accident*, in R.E. GRANDY - R. WARNER [eds.], *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986, pp. 411-439, in part. pp. 416-417; S. MENN, *Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories*, «Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale», 100 [1995], pp. 311-337, in part. pp. 325-326), sometimes by ‘to be recipient of’ (‘δεκτικὸς εἶναι’ + gen.) (*Cat.* 5, 4 a 11; a 13; a 18; a 30; a 34; b 3-4; b 5; b 7; b 10; b 12; b 14; b 16; b 17-18; 6, 6 a 1-2; 10, 12 a 29-30) or ‘to receive’ (‘δέχεσθαι’) (*Cat.* 5, 4 b 6-7; b 13; b 15; b 16). There are antecedents of this jargon in Plato (*Phaed.* 104 b 8-10).

⁵ *Cat.* 10, 11 b 38-12 a 17 (> T 5); 12 b 27-35; *An. Pr.* 1.36, 48 b 2-9; 37, 49 a 6-9; *Top.* 2.2, 109 a 34-38 (cf. G.E.L. OWEN, *Inherence* [1965], in Id., *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. by M. Nussbaum, Duckworth, London 1986, pp. 252-258, here p. 252).

⁶ *Cat.* 3, 1 b 10-15; b 22-24; 5, 2 a 34-b 6; 2 b 15-17 (cf. 2 a 34-35 and 2 b 4-5); 2 b 20; 2 b 31; 3 a 3-4; 3 a 34-b 5; 10, 11 b 38-12 a 17 (> T 5); 12 a 40 (< T 6); 12 b 27-35.

⁷ *Cat.* 5, 2 a 19-34; 3 a 15-20; a 25-27 (cf. R.M. DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle’s First Thoughts about Substances*, «The Philosophical Review», 84 [1975], pp. 338-373, in part. p. 355; M.L. GILL, *Aristotle on*

Do the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group express the relation of being SAID OF?

I would like to focus on the first use of the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group, i.e. the use according to which they express a relation that obtains between things in the world. Some passages suggest that when verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group are employed to express a relation that obtains between things in the world, this relation is that of being SAID OF; other passages suggest instead that when they are employed to express a relation that obtains between things in the world, this is a generic relation of predication that includes both that of being SAID OF and that of being IN.

Here are some of the passages that support the first interpretation⁸. The first is the beginning of *Categories* 3:

T 1 Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. For instance, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man: animal will therefore be predicated of the individual man also (for the individual man is both a man and an animal) (1 b 10-15).

In T 1 the general thesis (at 1 b 10-12) that the relation of being SAID OF is transitive is formulated by using 'to be predicated as of a subject', 'to be predicated of', and 'to be said of'.⁹ But the example (at 1 b 12-15) which supports or illustrates this general thesis is formulated by using only 'to be predicated of'. Such a usage strongly suggests that the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group should express the same relation expressed by 'to be said of', i.e. the relation of being SAID OF. (The role of the clause 'as of a subject' in the verb-phrase 'to be predicated as of a subject' at 1 b 10-11 is surely not that of narrowing down a more general use of 'to be predicated of': for when, at *Cat.* 5, 3b 4-5, the thesis that the relation of being SAID OF is transitive is repeated, it is formulated by using simply 'to be predicated of', without the allegedly restrictive clause 'as of a subject'. A more plausible explanation of the role of 'as of a subject' in 'to be predicated as of a subject' at 1 b 10-11 is that it connects the use of the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group with 'to be said of a subject': if this is correct, then Aristotle is hinting that the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group express the relation of being SAID OF)¹⁰.

Another passage in support of the first interpretation comes from *Categories* 5:

T 2 All the other items either are said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects. This is clear from the individual cases which we are considering:¹¹ for instance, animal is predicated of man, and therefore also of the individual man (for were it predicated of

the Individuation of Changes, «Ancient Philosophy», 4 [1985], pp. 9-22, in part. pp. 21-22; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, p. 126).

⁸ Cf. J. OWENS, *Aristotle on Categories* (1960), in *Id.*, *Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph Owens*, SUNY Press, Albany (NY) 1981, pp. 14-22, in part. p. 16; D.W. HAMLYN, *Aristotle on Predication*, «Phronesis», 6 (1961), pp. 110-126, in part. p. 113; OWEN, *Inherence*, p. 252; J. DUERLINGER, *Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories*, «Phronesis», 15 (1970), pp. 179-203, in part. p. 189; DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, pp. 353-356.

⁹ At 1 b 12, as elsewhere in the *Categories*, 'ρήθήσεται' functions simply as the future of 'λέγεσθαι' (cf. 7, 6 b 28-36; 7 a 34; 7 a 39-b 1; b 3; b 6; b 14; 8, 10 b 26-28; 11 a 10; a 13; 10, 13 a 6; a 10).

¹⁰ Cf. MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, p. 53; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, p. 134.

¹¹ The cases of animal and man were mentioned at 3, 1 b 12-15 (< T 1), those of colour and body at 2, 1 a 27-28.

none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all); again, colour is in body, and therefore also in an individual body (for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all). Hence all the other items either are said of the primary substances as subjects or are in them as subjects. So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other items to exist (2 a 34 -b 6)¹².

Two features of T 2 are relevant. First, ‘to be predicated of’ (at 2 a 36-b 1) is so contrasted with ‘to be in’ (at 2 b 1-3)¹³ that it can only express the relation of being SAID OF. Secondly, the general thesis (at 2 a 34-35 and 2 b 3-5) that all the other items either are SAID OF primary substances or are IN them is supported (at 2 a 35-b 3) by some examples. Those examples which support the part of the general thesis that concerns the relation of being SAID OF are formulated by using ‘to be predicated of’. The examples would fail to support this part of the general thesis if ‘to be predicated of’ were expressing a relation more general than that of being SAID OF¹⁴.

On the other hand, two passages from *Categories* 5 suggest that when verb-phrases from the ‘to be predicated’-group are employed to express a relation that obtains between things in the world, this relation is (not that of being SAID OF, but) a generic relation of predication that includes both that of being SAID OF and that of being IN. Here is the first passage:

T 3 It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, only their species and genera among the other items should be called ‘secondary substances’: for only they among items predicated reveal the primary substance (2 b 29-31).

In this passage, the phrase ‘among items predicated’ (2 b 31) is most plausibly taken to cover both items that are SAID OF primary substances and items that are IN primary substances¹⁵.

The second passage comes shortly after:

T 4 Moreover, it is because they are subjects for all other things that primary substances are called ‘substances’ most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to all other things, so also the species and the genera of primary substances stand to all the rest. For all the rest are predicated of these: for you will call the individual man ‘grammatical’, and you will therefore call ‘grammatical’ also man and animal (similarly in other cases). (2 b 37-3 a 6)

As for T 4’s context, Aristotle is arguing that, apart from primary substances, only the species and genera of primary substances are also substances, albeit to a lesser degree. He offers two arguments. The first, presented in the passage (2 b 29-37) that immediately precedes T 4, appeals to the fact that only the species and genera of primary substances may be mentioned in answering the question ‘What is it?’ asked about a primary substance. Aristotle’s second argument is presented in T 4 itself. Aristotle begins by observing that the reason why primary substances deserve being called ‘substances’ in the strictest sense is that they bear a certain relation to ‘all other things’, i.e. the species and genera of primary substances and non-substantial items: each of

¹² Cf. 2 b 15-17.

¹³ At 2 b 1-3 ‘εἶναι’ is understood.

¹⁴ Cf. PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 134.

¹⁵ Cf. M. FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelean Metaphysics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 10-11, 28; R. BODÉUS (éd.), *Aristote. Catégories*, éd., tr., et notes, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001, p. 83; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 126.

these is either SAID OF or IN some primary substance or other. He then claims that the species and genera of primary substances bear a similar relation to 'all the rest', i.e. non-substantial items: each of these is either SAID OF or IN some species or some genus of primary substances (note that *differentiae* are non-substantial items and are SAID OF species of primary substances)¹⁶. This analogy warrants awarding the title 'substance' also to the species and genera of primary substances¹⁷. So, in the sentence 'all the rest are predicated of these' (3 a 3-4), the verb-phrase 'to be predicated of' expresses a general relation which covers both the relation of being SAID OF and that of being IN¹⁸.

Thus, the textual evidence pushes in different directions. The most plausible account of Aristotle's use of verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group in the *Categories* seems to me to be the following: as far as meaning is concerned, these verb-phrases express a general relation which covers both the relation of being SAID OF and that of being IN; however, in certain contexts, the verb-phrases in question stand for the relation of being SAID OF as opposed to that of being IN. The contextually restricted use comes into play in particular when a verb-phrase from the 'to be predicated'-group is employed in tandem with 'to be in' or some other verb-phrase connected with it. This flexible use of the verb-phrases from the 'to be predicated'-group fits well with the circumstance that such verb-phrases are employed in the *Categories* in a possibly even more divergent way, i.e. for a relation that obtains between linguistic expressions and things in the world¹⁹. Aristotle is perhaps allowing himself a vast array of ways of employing verb-phrases of this group.

2. Examples and characteristics of being-said-of

Being SAID OF and being IN: some examples from the Categories

The universal animal is SAID OF the universal man, and both these universals are SAID OF men²⁰. The universals walking²¹ and biped (which are IN nothing) are SAID OF

¹⁶ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 21-28 (cf. 5, 3 b 1-2).

¹⁷ Cf. PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 133-136; M. KOHL, *Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories*, «Phronesis», 53 (2008), pp. 152-179, in part. pp. 159-163. The account of Aristotle's analogy offered by Perin and Kohl is more complex than the one I presented in the main text above.

¹⁸ Cf. M. FREDE, *Individuals in Aristotle* (1978), in *Id.*, *Essays in Ancient Philosophy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, pp. 49-71, in part. p. 53; A. GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, in P. MORAUX - J. WIESNER (hrsg.), *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum: Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum (Berlin, 7.-16. September 1981)*, de Gruyter, Berlin and New York 1983, pp. 30-56, in part. pp. 35-37; GILL, *Aristotle on the Individuation of Changes*, pp. 11, 22; CODE, *Aristotle: Essence and Accident*, p. 417; FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche*, pp. 10-11; 28; D.T. DEVEREUX, *Aristotle's Categories 3b10-21: A Reply to Sharma*, «Ancient Philosophy», 18 (1998), pp. 341-352, in part. p. 348; BODÉUS, *Aristote. Catégories*, p. 83; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, p. 126.

¹⁹ Cf. above, fn. 7 and text thereto.

²⁰ *Cat.* 3, 1 b 12-15 (< T 1); 5, 2 a 36-b 1 (< T 2); 2 b 30-34; 3 a 10-15.

²¹ 'Walking' (which should be regarded as short for 'using feet as the main means of locomotion') is a translation of 'πεζόν', which might be rendered also by 'footed'. Consider the following passage from *de Partibus Animalium* 1.2: 'Some of the multipeds [πολυπόδων] are ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς, others among the aquatic [ἐν τοῖς ἐνυδροῖς]' (642 b 19-20). If 'πεζόν' here meant 'footed', the passage would be saying that some of the multipeds are among footed animals, others among the aquatic – which would presuppose the trivial falsehood that some of the multipeds are not footed. The passage does not presuppose anything trivially false if 'πεζόν' means 'walking'. Again, at *Top.* 4.6, 144 b 22-23 (cf. *Cat.* 3, 1 b 18-19; 13, 14 b 33-15

the universal man as well as of men²². The universal knowledge is SAID OF the universal grammatical-knowledge, and both these universals are SAID OF this individual grammatical knowledge; the universal knowledge, the universal grammatical-knowledge, and this individual grammatical knowledge all are IN the universal soul²³.

In general: a genus is SAID OF all its subordinate species, and both a genus and any of its subordinate species are SAID OF each of those individuals that are members of that subordinate species²⁴; it is not the case that a genus is IN any of its species²⁵; a *differentia* is SAID OF both the species which it separates off and the individuals which are members of that species²⁶; it is not the case that a *differentia* is IN the species which it separates off²⁷.

Being SAID OF and being IN: more examples from the Categories (chapter 10 on contraries)

The following passage from *Categories* 10 contains further interesting examples of being SAID OF and being IN:

T 5 If contraries are such that it is necessary for one or the other of them to hold of those things which they naturally come to be in or are predicated of, then there is nothing intermediate between them: [...] for instance, sickness and health naturally come to be in animals' bodies, and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to hold of the body of the animal, either sickness or health; again, odd and even are predicated of numbers, and it is indeed necessary for one or the other to hold of a number, either odd or even. [...] But if it is not necessary for one or the other to hold, then there is something intermediate between them: for instance, black and white naturally come to be in bodies, but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to hold of a body (for not every body is white or black);²⁸ again, bad and good are predicated of men and of many other things,²⁹ but it is not necessary for one or the other of them to hold of those things they are predicated of³⁰ (for not all are either bad or good) (11 b 38-12 a 17).

In T 5 the verb-phrase 'to come to be in'³¹, which expresses the process that leads to the condition expressed by 'to be in', is contrasted with 'to be predicated of'. Earlier³² I argued that when a verb-phrase from the 'to be predicated of'-group is employed in tan-

a 7) Aristotle uses 'πεζὸν ζῶον' and 'πτηνὸν ζῶον' to name two co-ordinate genera. The second of these two genera – the one which he names 'πτηνὸν ζῶον' – is the genus flying-animal. Aristotle admits that some member of this genus is footed (for at 144 b 23-24 he treats biped as a *differentia* of it). Therefore by 'πεζόν' Aristotle here probably does not mean 'footed': otherwise the first of the two genera in question – the one which Aristotle names 'πεζὸν ζῶον' – would be the genus footed-animal, and those members of the genus flying-animal which are footed would be members also of the genus footed-animal, so that Aristotle would be committing himself to the claim that the two coordinate genera are not disjoint.

²² *Cat.* 5, 3 a 21-28 (cf. 5, 3 b 1-2).

²³ *Cat.* 2, 1 a 29-b 3; 1 a 25-27 (cf. *Top.* 6.6, 144 a 31-b 1).

²⁴ *Cat.* 5, 2 b 20; 3 a 37-39; *Top.* 4.6, 127 b 1-4.

²⁵ *Top.* 4.6, 127 b 1-4.

²⁶ *Cat.* 5, 3 b 1-2.

²⁷ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 22.

²⁸ On white being IN body, cf. *Cat.* 2, 1 a 27-28; 5, 2 a 31.

²⁹ On bad and good, cf. *Cat.* 5, 4 a 15-16 (which suggests that actions are at least some of the other things which good and bad are predicated of); 4 a 18-21; 8, 10 b 5-9; 10, 13 a 22-31; J.C. KUNKEL, *A New Look at Non-Essential Predication in the "Categories"*, «The New Scholasticism», 45 (1971), pp. 110-116, in part. p. 115.

³⁰ In other words, it is not necessary that either bad or good should hold of each of the individuals which it would be in principle possible for them to be predicated of.

³¹ Cf. *Cat.* 5, 4 b 12-13; *Top.* 4.5, 126 a 3-5; a 11-12.

³² Cf. above, paragraph to fn. 19.

dem with 'to be in' or some other verb-phrase connected with it, the verb-phrase from the 'to be predicated'-group may be plausibly taken to stand for the relation of being SAID OF. It may then be plausibly inferred that in T 5 'to be predicated of' stands for the relation of being SAID OF as opposed to that of being IN³³.

So, in T 5 Aristotle distinguishes two main types of pairs of contraries: pairs of contraries which have nothing intermediate between them, on the one hand, and pairs of contraries that do have an intermediate between them, on the other. Within each of these two main types, he then distinguishes two parallel subordinate types: of pairs of contraries which have nothing intermediate between them, some (e.g. sickness and health) are such as to be IN the individuals that enjoy them while others (e.g. odd and even) are such as to be SAID OF the individuals that fall under them; similarly, of pairs of contraries that do have an intermediate between them, some (e.g. blackness and whiteness)³⁴ are such as to be IN the individuals that enjoy them while others (e.g. bad and good) are such as to be SAID OF the individuals that fall under them. In particular: the universal odd is SAID OF some numbers, and, similarly, the universal even is SAID OF some numbers³⁵; the universal bad is SAID OF some men (as well as of many other things), and, similarly, the universal good is SAID OF some men (as well as of many other things)³⁶.

Being SAID OF and being IN: more examples from the Categories (chapter 10 on blindness and to-be-blind)

The following passage from *Categories* 10 provides one last interesting example:

T 6 If blindness were identical to to-be-blind, they would be both predicated of the same thing: but although the man is called 'blind', in no way is the man called 'blindness' (12 a 39-b 1).

The following three facts about T 6 help us to find a plausible interpretation of it:

(i) In T 6 to-be-blind and blindness are not the linguistic expressions 'to be blind' and 'blindness', but items 'out there in the world'. Specifically: to-be-blind is the universal signified by the verb 'to be blind' (or finite forms of it); blindness is the property signified by the name 'blindness'. Three considerations support this conclusion.

³³ Cf. SIMP. in *Cat.* 386, 30-387, 16; TH. WAITZ (hrsg.), *Aristoteles. Organon Graece*, Hahn, Leipzig 1844-1846, I, p. 275; OWEN, *Inherence*, pp. 252, 255. I cannot agree with those commentators (PHLP. in *Cat.* 173, 1-19; J.L. ACKRILL [ed.], *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, transl. and notes, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963, p. 109; K. OEHLER [hrsg.], *Aristoteles. Kategorien*, intr., transl., and comm., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1984, p. 269; BODÉUS, *Aristote. Catégories*, p. 144) who think that 'γίγνεσθαι ἐν' + dat. and 'κατηγορεῖσθαι' and 'κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ' + gen. in T 5 are unrelated to 'εἶναι ἐν' + dat. and 'κατηγορεῖσθαι' and 'κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ' + gen. in *Categories* 3-5. Nor can I agree with the claim, made by K. BÄRTHLEIN, *Zur Entstehung der aristotelischen Substanz-Akzidens-Lehre*, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 50 (1968), pp. 196-253, in part. p. 237, that T 5 deletes the distinction between the relations of being SAID OF and being IN.

³⁴ I take it that in T 5 the words 'black' and 'white', in their earliest occurrences at 12 a 11, function as names of qualities rather than as adjectives, i.e. as equivalent to 'blackness' and 'whiteness' (cf. 2, 1 a 27-28; 5, 2 a 31).

³⁵ Following ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 32-33, I understand 'ἄριθμοῦ' at 12 a 6-7 as generalizing on numbers (i.e. single numbers that fall under the universal number), not as naming the universal number (similarly with 'σώματι ζώου' at 12 a 4, 'σώματι' at 12 a 11, and 'ἀνθρώπου' at 12 a 14). Aristotle is unlikely to be saying that either the universal odd or the universal even is SAID OF the universal number: otherwise, given the transitivity of being SAID OF, he would be committing himself to the (obviously false) claim that either the universal odd is SAID OF each single number or the universal even is.

³⁶ Cf. *Cat.* 10, 12 b 27-35, which probably implies that the universal hot is SAID OF some bodies, and, similarly, that the universal cold is SAID OF some bodies.

First, the *Categories* are mainly concerned (not with linguistic expressions, but) with the items signified by linguistic expressions. Secondly, suppose that to-be-blind and blindness were the linguistic expressions ‘to be blind’ and ‘blindness’. Then it would be immediately obvious that to-be-blind is distinct from blindness, and there would be no need of an argument to show that they are distinct. But T 6 is just that: an argument whose intent is to show that to-be-blind is distinct from blindness. Analogous considerations rule out the possibility that one of the two items might be a linguistic expression and the other what is signified by a linguistic expression. Thirdly, T 6 is supposed to provide an example in support of the general thesis that being deprived is different from the corresponding privation: to-be-blind is an example of being deprived whereas blindness is an example of a privation (cf. 12 a 35-39). Since privations are not linguistic expressions but items signified by linguistic expressions, it follows that blindness here is not a linguistic expression but an item signified by one. This makes it plausible to assume that to-be-blind is also an item signified by a linguistic expression.

(ii) In T 6 ‘to be predicated of’ expresses the relation of being SAID OF. For, T 6 contains an argument. One part of this argument is expressed by the conditional ‘If blindness were identical to to-be-blind, they would be both predicated of the same thing’ (12 a 39-41). On its most plausible reconstruction, this argument presupposes that the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ obtains between one from among blindness and to-be-blind, on the one hand, and the item referred to by ‘the man’, i.e. by T 6’s two occurrences of ‘the man’ (at 12 a 41 and b 1), on the other hand. It is because the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ obtains between one from among blindness and to-be-blind and the item referred to by ‘the man’ that the assumption that blindness is identical to to-be-blind entails that both blindness and to-be-blind are linked by the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ to the item referred to by ‘the man’. Which from among blindness and to-be-blind is supposed to be linked by the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ to the item referred to by ‘the man’? The last part of T 6’s argument, expressed by the words «although the man is called ‘blind’, in no way is the man called ‘blindness’» (12 a 41-b 1), is supposed to show that one of the two candidates is ruled out, and in particular that blindness is ruled out. We may therefore plausibly infer that the argument presupposes the following two points:

[a] The relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ does not obtain between blindness and the item referred to by ‘the man’

and

[b] The relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ obtains between to-be-blind and the item referred to by ‘the man’.

On the other hand, it may be plausibly assumed that

[c] Blindness is IN the item referred to by ‘the man’.

Point [c] is not formulated in T 6, but appears to be required by the ontological theory presented in the first chapters of the *Categories*.

Now, [a] and [c] require that the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ should neither be the relation of being IN nor be entailed by the relation of being IN: otherwise, as a consequence of [c], the relation expressed by ‘to be predicated of’ would

obtain between blindness and the item referred to by 'the man', contrary to [a]. But, if the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' is neither the relation of being IN nor entailed by the relation of being IN, what could it be if not the relation of being SAID OF?

There is further evidence that in T 6 the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' is that of being SAID OF. For, in order to show that the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' does not obtain between blindness and the item referred to by 'the man', Aristotle says that «although the man is called 'blind', in no way is the man called 'blindness'» (12 a 41-b 1). In other words, in order to show that the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' does not obtain between blindness and the item referred to by 'the man', Aristotle points out that the name, 'blindness', of blindness does not apply to the item referred to by 'the man'. As we shall see³⁷, Aristotle explicitly posits that an item is SAID OF another item only if both the first item's name and the *definiens* of its definition apply to the second. So, Aristotle is appealing to the failure to satisfy a necessary condition for the relation of being SAID OF in order to establish that the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' does not obtain. This again suggests that in T 6 the relation expressed by 'to be predicated of' is that of being SAID OF.

(iii) In T 6 the item referred to by 'the man' is not the universal man, but a man (an individual). Since (as argued in (ii)) in T 6 'to be predicated of' expresses the relation of being SAID OF, we may plausibly infer, on the basis of [b], that T 6's argument presupposes that to-be-blind is SAID OF the item referred to by 'the man'. If the item referred to by 'the man' were the species man, then T 6's argument would be presupposing that to-be-blind is SAID OF the species man. Then T 6's argument would be committed to the patently false claim that to-be-blind is SAID OF every man (because, on the one hand, the relation of being SAID OF is transitive, and, on the other hand, the species man is SAID OF every man). Since T 6's argument should not be taken to be committed to such an obviously false claim, the item referred to by 'the man' is not the species man. Now, if the item referred to by 'the man' is not the species man, what could it be if not a man (an individual)?

Thus, according to T 6, the universal to-be-blind is SAID OF some man (an individual) whom the property blindness is not SAID OF (though it is IN him). Since Aristotle acknowledges that some man comes to be blind³⁸, he would probably grant that the universal to-be-blind at one time is not, and at another (later) time is, SAID OF the same (individual) man.

Some characteristics of the relation of being SAID OF

If an item is SAID OF another item, then both the first item's name and the *definiens* of its definition apply to³⁹ the second; by contrast, if an item is IN another item, then though it may happen that the first item's name applies to the second, the *definiens* of its definition certainly doesn't⁴⁰. For instance, the species man is SAID OF Socrates, and both man's name, 'man', and the *definiens* of its definition, 'biped walking animal'⁴¹, apply to Socrates; justice is IN Socrates, and neither justice's name, 'justice', nor the *definiens* of its definition, 'virtue that produces equality or distributes what is

³⁷ Cf. below, fn. 40 and text thereto.

³⁸ *Cat.* 10, 13 a 31-36.

³⁹ Aristotle uses 'κατηγορεῖσθαι' and 'κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ' + gen.

⁴⁰ *Cat.* 5, 2 a 19-34 (cf. 3 a 15-20; a 25-28; a 33-b 9; 8, 11 a 5-13; *Top.* 4.1, 121 a 11-14 > T 7).

⁴¹ *Int.* 5, 17 a 11-13; *Top.* 1.4, 101 b 32-33; 7, 103 a 26-27; 2.1, 109 a 13-16; 5.3, 132 a 1-3.

equal'⁴², applies to Socrates (because Socrates – however just and virtuous he may be – is not a virtue); the property whiteness is IN Socrates, and though the property's name, 'white', applies to Socrates (because 'white' can function both as a name of the property whiteness and as a colour-adjective)⁴³, the *definiens* of its definition, 'colour which disperses the vision'⁴⁴, does not apply to Socrates (because Socrates – however white or coloured he may be – is not a colour)⁴⁵.

The relation of being SAID OF is transitive: if one item is SAID OF a second item which in turn is SAID OF a third, then the first item is SAID OF the third⁴⁶. Moreover, the relation of being SAID OF is not reflexive: primary substances and, in general, those entities which are individuals are SAID OF nothing, hence it is not the case that they are SAID OF themselves.

3. What does being-said-of amount to?

Some traditional interpretations of the relation of being SAID OF

Most commentators think that the relation of being SAID OF is essential predication⁴⁷. This is probably wrong. For, the universal bad is SAID OF some man, but it is not

⁴² *Top.* 6.5, 143 a 15-19.

⁴³ Cf. *Metaph.* Z 6, 1031 b 22-28; *SIMP. in Cat.* 54, 16-21; ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 72; OWEN, *Inherence*, p. 253; DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, pp. 353, 359; M.T. FERREJOHN, *Aristotle on Necessary Truth and Logical Priority*, «American Philosophical Quarterly», 18 (1981), pp. 285-293, in part. p. 288; GILL, *Aristotle on the Individuation of Changes*, p. 21; M.J. LOUX, *Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1991, p. 19; MENN, *Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories*, p. 322.

⁴⁴ *Top.* 3.5, 119 a 30 (cf. *Cat.* 11, 14 a 20-22; *Top.* 1.15, 107 b 27-30; 7.3, 153 a 36-b 1; *Metaph.* I 7, 1057 b 8-10; b 18-19; *SIMP. in Cat.* 390, 3).

⁴⁵ *Top.* 3.1, 116 a 25-27 (cf. *Metaph.* Δ 29, 1024 b 34-1025 a 1; Θ 7, 1049 a 32).

⁴⁶ *Cat.* 3, 1 b 10-15 (= T 1); 5, 3 b 4-5 (cf. *Top.* 4.1, 121 a 25-26; 2, 122 a 3-6; a 31-b 4; ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 76; G. PATZIG, *Bemerkungen zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles*, in E. SCHEIBE - E. SÜSSMAN (hrsg.), *Einheit und Vielheit: Festschrift für C.F. von Weizsäcker zum 60. Geburtstag*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1973, pp. 60-76, in part. p. 65; M.D. ROHR, *Aristotle on the Transitivity of Being Said of*, «Journal of the History of Philosophy», 16 [1978], pp. 379-385, in part. pp. 380-381, 384-385; CODE, *Aristotle: Essence and Accident*, pp. 414, 431; G. BRAKAS, *Aristotle's Concept of the Universal*, Olms, Hildesheim - Zürich - New York 1988, pp. 80-81; LOUX, *Primary Ousia*, pp. 24, 26; MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, pp. 52-53, 60, 186). Some commentators (e.g. FERREJOHN, *Aristotle on Necessary Truth and Logical Priority*, p. 287; M.V. WEDIN, *The Strategy of Aristotle's Categories*, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 79 [1997], pp. 1-26, in part. pp. 13-15) doubt that at *Cat.* 3, 1 b 10-15 (= T 1) Aristotle is asserting the transitivity of the relation of being SAID OF.

⁴⁷ PORPH. *in Cat.* 79, 35-80, 27; AMMON. *in Cat.* 30, 25-31, 12; PHLIP. *in Cat.* 38, 19-39, 15; OLYMP. *in Cat.* 50, 13-18; *SIMP. in Cat.* 51, 30-52, 2; 52, 16-18; ELIAS *in Cat.* 153, 15-26; ANON. *in Cat.* 7, 20-8; G. CALOGERO, *I fondamenti della logica aristotelica* (1927), La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1968², p. 168; P. COOKE - H. TREDENNICK (eds.), *Aristotle. The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics*, ed. and transl., Harvard University Press - Heinemann, Cambridge (MA) - London 1938, pp. 18-19; C.-W. CHEN, *On Aristotle's Two Expressions: καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεσθαι and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι*, «Phronesis», 2 (1957), pp. 148-159, in part. p. 149; M. MIGNUCCI, *La teoria aristotelica della scienza*, Sansoni, Firenze 1965, pp. 228-230; D. PESCE (a cura di), *Aristotele. Le categorie*, intr., trans., and comm., Liviana, Padova 1967, p. 30; MATTHEWS - COHEN, *The One and the Many*, p. 638; R.E. ALLEN, *Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories*, «Phronesis», 14 (1969), pp. 31-39, in part. 38-39; DUERLINGER, *Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 181, 194; W. LESZL, *Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle: Aristotle's Treatment of Types of Equivocity and Its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories*, Antenore, Padova 1970, p. 214; R.E. ALLEN, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories*, in E.N. LEE - A.P.D. MOURELATOS - R.M. RORTY (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*,

predicated essentially of him (because it is possible for that man to become good from bad)⁴⁸. Again, the universal to-be-blind is SAID OF some man, but it is not predicated essentially of him (because it is possible for that man to have gone blind)⁴⁹.

Other commentators think that being SAID OF is the relation which links genera and species to those individuals which are their members⁵⁰. This view must be wrong. To begin with, it clashes with the same examples that tell against the claim that the relation of being SAID OF is essential predication. Moreover, the universals walking and biped are not substances⁵¹. Since secondary substances are the genera and the species of primary

Van Gorcum, Assen 1973, pp. 362-373, in part. pp. 365-366, 370; S.M. COHEN, "Predicable of" in *Aristotle's Categories*, «Phronesis», 18 (1973), pp. 69-70, in part. p. 69; E. BERTI, *Aristotele. Dalla dialettica alla filosofia prima*, CEDAM, Padova 1977, pp. 183-184; ROHR, *Aristotle on the Transitivity of Being Said of*, p. 379; FERREJOHN, *Aristotle on Necessary Truth and Logical Priority*, p. 287; GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, pp. 33-34, 44; OEHLER, *Aristoteles. Kategorien*, pp. 180-181; A. CODE, *On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses about Predication*, in J. BOGEN - E. MCGUIRE (eds.), *How Things Are*, Reidel, Dordrecht 1985, pp. 101-131, in part. pp. 103, 124; ID., *Aristotle: Essence and Accident*, p. 417; GRAHAM, *Aristotle's Two Systems*, pp. 40-41; H. BENSON, *Universals as Sortals in the Categories*, «Pacific Philosophical Quarterly», 69 (1988), pp. 282-306, in part. pp. 285-286; FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche*, pp. 23-24; M. ZANATTA (a cura di), *Aristotele. Le categorie*, intr., trans., and notes, Rizzoli, Milano 1989, pp. 421-422; LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, pp. 73-77; LOUX, *Primary Ousia*, pp. 18, 21; D. MORRISON, *The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: a Criticism*, in A. PREUS - J.P. ANTON (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. 5, State University of New York Press, Albany (NY) 1992, pp. 19-46, in part. pp. 19, 25, 34; ID., *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l' "Organon"*, «Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger», 183 (1993), pp. 151-178, in part. pp. 156-157; D. BOSTOCK (ed.), *Aristotle. Metaphysics. Books Z and H*, trans. and comm., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994, p. 47; R.K. SHARMA, *A New Defense of Tropes? On Categories 3b10-18*, «Ancient Philosophy», 17 (1997), pp. 309-315, in part. p. 311; A.T. BÄCK, *Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, Brill, Leiden - Boston - Köln 2000, pp. 166-167; MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, pp. 23, 186; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 128-129.

⁴⁸ *Cat.* 5, 4 a 18-21; a 29-32; 10, 13 a 22-31 (a passage closely linked to T 5).

⁴⁹ Cf. above, fn. 38 and text thereto.

⁵⁰ Cf. ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 75-76; E. HARTMAN, *Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1977, p. 13; GILL, *Aristotle on the Individuation of Changes*, pp. 10; 21-22; BODÉUS, *Aristotele. Catégories*, pp. 82-83.

⁵¹ Walking, biped, and, in general, *differentiae* are not substances: for, at *Cat.* 5, 3 a 21-25, they are mentioned in order to show that the feature of not being in anything is not peculiar (ἴδιον) to substances (cf. *Top.* 6.6, 143 a 31-34; 144 a 20-21; PHLP. in *Cat.* 66, 26-27; SIMP. in *Cat.* 98, 7-8; DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 350; R. HEINAMAN, *Non-substantial Individuals in the Categories*, «Phronesis», 26 (1981), pp. 295-307, in part. p. 301; BRAKAS, *Aristotle's Concept of the Universal*, p. 79; LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, p. 56; D.T. DEVEREUX, *Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories*, «Ancient Philosophy», 12 (1992), pp. 113-131, in part. pp. 120-121; H. GRANGER, *Aristotle on Genus and Differentia*, in PREUS - ANTON (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, pp. 69-93, in part. pp. 71-72, 76; MORRISON, *The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories*, p. 25; ID., *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l' "Organon"*, pp. 161, 166; SHARMA, *A New Defense of Tropes?*, p. 311; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 129-130). Rather, walking, biped, and many other *differentiae* are qualified items: *Top.* 4.2, 122 b 15-17; 6, 128 a 26-29; 6.6, 144 a 17-22; 144 b 3 1-145 a 2; *Phys.* 5.2, 226 a 27-28; *Metaph.* Δ 14, 1020 a 33-b 2; b 14-15; 28, 1024 b 5-6 (cf. DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 359; D.W. GRAHAM, *Aristotle's Two Systems*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987, p. 33; GRANGER, *Aristotle on Genus and Differentia*, pp. 71, 76; MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l' "Organon"*, pp. 156-161; MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, pp. 194-195). Some *differentiae* belong to non-substantial categories other than that of qualified items (e.g. to that of relatives, *Top.* 6.6, 145 a 13-18, cf. 8, 146 b 20-35; MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l' "Organon"*, pp. 150, 160-161, 167), though *differentiae* of substances cannot belong to the category of place (*Top.* 6.6, 144 b 31-145 a 2, cf. MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans*

substances⁵², it follows that the universals walking and biped are neither genera nor species of primary substances (otherwise they would be substances, albeit secondary ones). Nevertheless, the universals walking and biped are SAID OF both the universal man, which is a secondary substance, and individual men, who are primary substances⁵³. So, in this case, the relation of being SAID OF does not link genera or species to individuals which are their members. Although, of course, genera and species are SAID OF those individuals which are their members, still the relation of being SAID OF is not the same as the relation which links genera and species to those individuals which are their members⁵⁴. We now understand why Aristotle introduces secondary substances not by declaring that they are the beings which are SAID OF primary substances, but by asserting that they are the genera and the species of primary substances⁵⁵: it is because among the beings SAID OF primary substances there are some which are neither genera nor species of primary substances and therefore are not secondary substances.

Also note that the universals walking and biped, which are not substances, are SAID OF both the universal man, which is a (secondary) substance, and men, who again are (primary) substances. Analogously, knowledge, which is a relative, is SAID OF grammatical-knowledge⁵⁶, which is not a relative but a quality⁵⁷. So, the relation of being SAID OF can obtain between members of different categories. This refutes an exegesis which one could be tempted by, namely that the relation of being SAID OF is the relation of simple predication restricted to beings from the same category.

What is then the relation of being SAID OF? In the *Categories* Aristotle seems to have two approaches to it.

Aristotle's first approach to the relation of being SAID OF: division, wholes, and parts

On his first approach, Aristotle links the concept of being SAID OF to some concept of division. There are three reasons for attributing to Aristotle the view that the concept of being SAID OF is linked to one of division. First, in the *Categories* individuals are, on the one hand, characterised as items which are SAID OF nothing, and, on the other

l'“*Organon*”, p. 157). *Metaphysics Z* seems to expound a conception of *differentiae* which differs from what we find in the *Organon* and in *Metaphysics Δ* in that the *differentia* is identified with the species it separates out (Z 12, 1038 a 25-5, cf. MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l'“Organon”*, pp. 153, 175).

⁵² *Cat.* 5, 2 a 14-19; 2 b 7-8; b 29-30.

⁵³ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 21-28; 3 b 1-2; b 5-9. Some commentators (e.g. ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 85-87; G.B. MATTHEWS - S.M. COHEN, *The One and the Many*, «The Review of *Metaphysics*», 21 [1967-1968], pp. 630-655, in part. p. 635; ALLEN, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories*, p. 367; SHARMA, *A New Defense of Tropes?*, p. 311) think that Aristotle makes a faux pas when he claims that the universals walking and biped are SAID OF the universal man and of men. In fact, Aristotle's claim is a symptom that there is something wrong with those commentators' interpretations of the relation of being SAID OF.

⁵⁴ Counter-examples analogous to those above refute the suggestion (made by J.M.E. MORAVCSIK, *Aristotle on Predication*, «The Philosophical Review», 76 [1967], pp. 80-96, in part. pp. 92-93, 95) that the relation of being SAID OF is the converse of the relation which obtains between items to be counted and count-attributes.

⁵⁵ Cf. above, fn. 52.

⁵⁶ *Cat.* 2, 1 b 1-3.

⁵⁷ *Cat.* 8, 11 a 20-32. At 11 a 23-24 Aristotle points out that the phenomenon in question is very common: «In pretty well all such cases the genera are spoken of in relation to something but none of the particular cases is».

hand, described by means of the word 'indivisible'⁵⁸. Secondly, in the *Categories* Aristotle uses the verb-phrase 'to belong in' to describe, on the one hand, the relationship of an individual to its species⁵⁹, and, on the other hand, the relationship of a part to its whole⁶⁰. Such a description suggests that an individual is contained in its species as a part in its whole⁶¹. Thirdly, in some passages outside the *Categories* Aristotle describes a universal as a whole which contains the items which it is SAID OF⁶².

Now, granted that for Aristotle the concept of being SAID OF is connected to some concept of division, the next problem is to find out more about the concept of division at play. It is natural to assume that the concept of division with which that of being SAID OF is connected should be understood on the background of the Platonic and Aristotelian method of division⁶³. The link to the method of division is strongly suggested by the fact that Aristotle applies the word 'indivisible' not only to individuals, but also to those species which are obtained by division and cannot be further divided⁶⁴.

⁵⁸ *Cat.* 2, 1 b 6; 5, 3 a 35; a 38; a 39; b 2; b 7; b 12 (cf. *Top.* 4.1, 121 a 36; a 37; 2, 122 b 21; b 22; 6.6, 144 b 3; *Sens.* 7, 448 a 3; *Metaph.* B 1, 995 b 29; 3, 998 b 16; 999 a 15; H.J. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre: Zur Geschichte des Universalienproblems im Platonismus*, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 55 (1973), pp. 119-190, in part. p. 158; M. MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, in H.C. GÜNTHER - A. RENGAKOS [hrsg.], *Beiträge zur antiken Philosophie: Festschrift für Wolfgang Kullman*, Steiner, Stuttgart 1997, pp. 135-151, in part. p. 144). Aristotle associates being 'indivisible' ('ἄτομον') with being 'numerically one' ('ἐν ἄριθμῷ'): *Cat.* 2, 1 b 6-7; 5, 3 b 12 (cf. 4 a 11; a 13; a 14; a 15; a 17-18; b 17; *SE* 22, 179 a 7).

⁵⁹ *Cat.* 5, 2 a 14-19.

⁶⁰ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 31-32 (cf. 2, 1 a 24-25). Also cf. the use of 'ἐνυπάρχειν' + dat. at *Metaph.* B 1, 995 b 28; 3, 998 a 22-23; a 26; a 31; b 13-14; Δ 3, 1014 a 26-27; 26, 1023 b 33-34.

⁶¹ Cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, p. 157; GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, p. 45; GRAHAM, *Aristotle's Two Systems*, p. 31.

⁶² *Phys.* 1.1, 184 a 25-26; *Metaph.* Δ 26, 1023 b 26-32 (cf. *Phys.* 4.1, 208 b 12-13; 3, 210 a 17-18; *GC* 1.3, 317 b 7; *Metaph.* B 3, 999 a 1-6; Δ 14, 1020 b 15-16; 25, 1023 b 17-19; b 24-25; OWEN, *Inherence*, p. 253; KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, pp. 138-139, 157; FREDE, *Individuals in Aristotle*, pp. 52-53; GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, p. 45; GILL, *Aristotle on the Individuation of Changes*, pp. 11-12, 13; G.B. MATTHEWS, *The Enigma of Categories 1a20ff and Why It Matters*, in T. PENNER - R.K. KRAUT (eds.), *Nature, Knowledge and Virtue: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung*, Academic Printing and Publishing, Edmonton 1989 («Apeiron», 22), pp. 91-104, in part. pp. 97-98; MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, pp. 141-142; DEVEREUX, *Aristotle's Categories 3b10-21*, pp. 346-347; M. MIGNUCCI, *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, «The Monist», 83 [2000], pp. 3-21, in part. p. 3). At *Cat.* 5, 3 b 22-23 Aristotle says that someone who mentions the genus animal «takes in [περιλαμβάνει] more» than someone who mentions the species man (cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, p. 157; GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, p. 45). Two further facts about Aristotle's terminology are relevant here: first, Aristotle contrast 'καθόλου' with 'κατὰ μέρος', 'ἐν μέρει', and 'ἐπὶ μέρος' (cf. *Apr.* 1.1, 24 a 17; a 18; 4, 26 b 1-2; 5, 27 a 26-8; *Phys.* 1.5, 189 a 7-8; 3.3, 202 b 23-24; 7.3, 247 b 6-7; b 20; *Cael.* 1.6, 274 a 19-20; *Meteor.* 2.4, 359 b 30-31; *Metaph.* K 3, 1060 b 32; *EN* 2.7, 1107 a 30-31; *Pol.* 1.13, 1260 a 24-25; *Rhet.* 1.1, 1354 b 5-7); secondly, he treats the adverbs 'ὅλως' and 'καθόλου' as synonyms (cf. *Metaph.* Δ 26, 1023 b 29).

⁶³ Cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, p. 158; CODE, *Aristotle: Essence and Accidental*, p. 421; MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, pp. 143-144; ID., *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, pp. 4-5, 20. Although he sometimes criticizes some aspects or versions of it, Aristotle endorses the method of division throughout his career (cf. MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, p. 143; ID., *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, p. 20).

⁶⁴ *Phys.* 5.4, 227 b 7; *PA* 1.3, 643 a 16; *Metaph.* Z 8, 1034 a 8; K 1, 1059 b 36 (cf. MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, pp. 144, 149; ID., *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, pp. 11-12).

According to the method of division, a ‘division’ occurs whenever a genus (which is a universal) is ‘divided’ by two or more *differentiae* (which are again universals) into two or more species (which are further universals), one species corresponding to each *differentia*: for instance, the genus animal is divided by the *differentiae* walking, flying, and aquatic into the species walking-animal, flying-animal, and aquatic-animal⁶⁵. It is the *differentiae* that divide the genus: what is divided is the genus, not the *differentiae*. Each species reached by the method of division is not only a part of its genus as a whole, but also a whole whose constitutive parts are its genus and its corresponding *differentia*⁶⁶. The concepts of whole and part therefore play a twofold role in the method of division: the genus as a whole is divided by the *differentiae* into its species as parts, and each of these species is in turn a whole whose parts are its genus and its corresponding *differentia*⁶⁷.

These features of the method of division suggest that the genus and the *differentia* should be the only items which are immediately SAID OF the species which they contribute to constitute (given the transitivity of the relation of being SAID OF, whatever is SAID OF the genus or the *differentia* will also be SAID OF the species). Thus: the genus animal and the *differentia* walking are (the only items immediately) SAID OF the species walking-animal, and the genus walking-animal and the *differentia* biped are (the only items immediately) SAID OF the species biped-walking-animal, i.e. man. This gives us an account of what it is for a universal to be SAID OF another universal.

When we come to consider what it is for a universal to be SAID OF an individual, the model of the Platonic and Aristotelian method of division cannot be applied directly because an individual is not one of those items which are reached by dividing some genus by means of two or more *differentiae* (for, on the one hand, individuals cannot be defined⁶⁸, and, on the other hand, if an individual were one of those items which are reached by dividing some genus by means of two or more *differentiae* then the string of expressions consisting of the name of the genus and that of the corresponding *differentia* would be a definition of the individual). However, even if the Platonic and Aristotelian method of division cannot be applied directly, an analogy might still be used to explain what happens when a universal is SAID OF an individual (here my account becomes very speculative, and goes far beyond the evidence available from

⁶⁵ Cf. *Top.* 6.6, 143 a 34-b 2 (reading ‘καὶ <τῶ> ἐνύδρω [καὶ τῶ δίποδι]’ at 143 b 2).

⁶⁶ *Int.* 11, 21 a 16-18 (cf. 20 b 36-21 a 4); *Phys.* 4.3, 210 a 18-20 (with W.D. Ross [ed.], *Aristotle. Physics*, intr., ed., and comm., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1936, p. 569, and BRAKAS, *Aristotle’s Concept of the Universal*, p. 102); *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a 29; 3, 1014 b 3-14; 6, 1015 b 24-27; 24, 1023 a 35-36; 25, 1023 b 22-25; Z 7, 1033 a 1-5; 10, 1035 a 3-4; 14, 1039 a 30-33; 15, 1040 a 15-21 (cf. *Phys.* 1.1, 184 a 26-b 3; 2.3, 194 b 26-29; MIGNUCCI, *Remarks on Aristotle’s Theory of Predication*, p. 143; ID., *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, p. 5).

⁶⁷ Aristotle is aware of the twofold role played by the concepts of part and whole in the process of division: at *Metaph.* Δ 25, 1023 b 22-25 he says that different uses or senses of ‘part’ are involved in the claim that the species is a part of the genus which, in turn, is a part of that species.

⁶⁸ *APo.* 2.13, 96 b 11-13; 97 b 26-28; *Metaph.* Z 10, 1036 a 2-5; 11, 1036 a 28-29; 1037 a 26-27; 15, 1039 b 27-29; 1040 a 5-7; *Schol. in Dion. Thrac.* 116, 13-16 (= ARIST. *de Ideis* fr. 117 Gigon 373 b 28-33) (cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, p. 160; M. MIGNUCCI, *In margine al concetto aristotelico di esistenza*, in *Scritti in onore di † Carlo Diano*, Pàtron, Bologna 1975, pp. 227-261, in part. p. 245; CODE, *On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses about Predication*, pp. 112, 119; PERIN, *Substantial Universals in Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 127).

Aristotle's works)⁶⁹. By analogy with what happens when two or more *differentiae* divide a genus into two or more corresponding species, one can regard each of the universals which (at a certain moment) hold non-essentially of an individual as a member of a range of incompatible universals, and as operating like a *differentia* in a process of division which gradually singles out that individual (at that moment) within its species and progresses through indefinitely many stages⁷⁰. Since a species is a whole whose constitutive parts are its genus and its corresponding *differentia*, our analogy requires that an individual (at a given moment) should be a whole whose constitutive parts are its species and all those universals which (at that moment) hold non-essentially of it. The indivisibility of an individual (at a certain moment) will consist in the fact that for every range of incompatible universals which could be taken to operate as *differentiae* for dividing the individual (at that moment), exactly one member of that range is already a part of the individual (at that moment), and has therefore already been employed in the process of division – all possible divisions have already been carried out. The result thus obtained is an individual because it cannot be divided further and therefore cannot play the role of a genus or a *differentia* in a division. What we have so far are 'individuals at moments'. The whole individual whose existence stretches over a period of time can then be retrieved as the 'temporal worm' consisting of all its 'temporal slices', i.e. the individuals at *t* for every moment *t* within a certain period (the period of the individual's life)⁷¹. So, the analogy with the Platonic and Aristotelian method of division suggests that not only the species, the genera, and the *differentiae* of an individual, but also all the universals which (at certain moments) hold non-essentially of that individual are SAID OF it (at those moments). Thus: the universals man, animal, walking, biped, courageous, musical, just, etc. are all SAID OF the individual Socrates (at certain moments). It follows that so far as we restrict ourselves to universals, the relation of being SAID OF is that of essential predication, but when we come to individuals being SAID OF is not essential predication.

Two facts are worth noting with regard to the first approach to being SAID OF which has just been presented:

(i) The *differentiae* involved in generating a species by 'dividing it out from' its genus are normally 'concrete' universals like walking and biped, not properties (or 'abstract' universals) like walking-ness and biped-ness⁷². This suggests that what is SAID OF a sub-

⁶⁹ Cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, pp. 158-159.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Metaph. Z* 15, 1040 a 14-15. In the *Philebus* Plato speaks of the passage from a lowest species to individuals as a 'letting pass away into the indefinite' (16 e 1-2). One recalls this when Aristotle uses the word 'indefinite' ('ἄπειρος') to describe individuals (cf. *Apo.* 1.24, 86 a 4; *Top.* 2.2, 109 b 14).

⁷¹ For the attribution to Aristotle of the idea that individuals are 'temporal worms' consisting of 'temporal slices', cf. A. CODE, *Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic*, «Journal of Philosophical Logic», 5 (1976), pp. 159-186, in part. pp. 174-182. Other commentators instead deny that Aristotle regarded individuals as 'temporal worms' (e.g. N.P. WHITE, *Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness*, «The Philosophical Review», 80 [1971], pp. 177-197, in part. pp. 195-196; F.D. MILLER JR., *Did Aristotle Have the Concept of Identity?*, «The Philosophical Review», 82 [1973], pp. 483-490, in part. p. 487).

⁷² *Cat.* 3, 1 b 18-20; *Top.* 4.2, 122 b 16-17; 5.6, 128 a 25-26 (cf. *Top.* 4.2, 122 b 37-123 a 2; 5.4, 133 b 14; 6.6, 144 b 33-34). The 'abstract' expressions 'walking-ness' and 'biped-ness' translate, respectively, 'ποδότης' (used by Aristotle at *PA* 1.3, 642 b 28 and *Metaph. Z* 12, 1038 a 15) and 'διποδία' (used at *PA* 1.3, 643 a 3). By contrast, the 'concrete' expressions 'walking' and 'biped' translate, respectively, 'πεζόν' and 'δίπου'. (I use 'biped-ness' rather than 'biped-hood' because I am taking as root the adjective 'biped', not the noun 'biped'.)

stance should be ‘concrete’ universals like walking, biped, courageous, musical, and just – not properties like walking-ness, biped-ness, courage, musicality, and justice.

(ii) The conception of individuals which corresponds to Aristotle’s first approach to the relation of being SAID OF might be regarded as ‘unaristotelian’: the idea that individuals are the final result of a process ‘from the top down’ might seem incompatible with the view that «it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other items and all the other items are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called ‘substances’ most of all» (*Cat.* 5, 2 b 15-17). It is not clear whether this *apparent* incompatibility is *real*. However that may be, it should be noted that Aristotle appeals precisely to the fact that the primary (unlike the secondary) substances are ‘indivisible’ in order to justify the claim that the primary (unlike the secondary) substances are ‘this something’⁷³.

Aristotle’s second approach to the relation of being SAID OF: applicability of name and definition

Aristotle’s second approach to the relation of being SAID OF has to do with the applicability of an item’s name and of the *definiens* of its definition. Aristotle declares that if one item is SAID OF another item, then both the first item’s name and the *definiens* of its definition (which are linguistic expressions) apply to the second item⁷⁴. He is thus giving a necessary condition for being SAID OF something. But perhaps he endorses the stronger claim that the applicability of an item’s name and of the *definiens* of its definition constitutes not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition for its being SAID OF something:

[1] An item *x* is SAID OF an item *y* iff both *x*’s name and the *definiens* of its definition apply to *y*⁷⁵.

Thesis [1] raises several philosophical problems: What counts as an item’s name? What as its definition? When is it that an item’s name or the *definiens* of its definition applies to a universal? I shall address only the last of these problems. To see what the difficulty is, let us develop one of Aristotle’s examples. Aristotle affirms that the *definiens* of the definition of the *differentia* biped, i.e. the phrase ‘having two feet’⁷⁶, applies to the universal man⁷⁷. He cannot mean that the universal man has two feet: he is obviously aware that universals do not have two (nor, for that matter, any other number of) feet. Now that we have seen what the difficulty is, we realise how its solution should go. When he says that the phrase ‘having two feet’ applies to the universal man, what Aristotle means must be, roughly, that the phrase describes the ‘nature’ or the ‘content’ of the universal. This suggests that an item’s name or the *definiens* of its definition should apply to a universal iff it describes its ‘nature’ or ‘content’. However, this is still disturbingly vague. Let me briefly characterise one way in which it might be made more precise (the following characterisation, though Aristotelian in style, goes beyond what we find in Aristotle’s

⁷³ *Cat.* 5, 3 b 10-23 (cf. KRÄMER, *Aristoteles und die akademische Eidoslehre*, p. 158; MIGNUCCI, *Parts, Quantification and Aristotelian Predication*, p. 12).

⁷⁴ Cf. above, fn. 40 and text thereto.

⁷⁵ Cf. FREDE, *Individuals in Aristotle*, p. 53; GRAESER, *Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift*, p. 37; CODE, *On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses about Predication*, pp. 103, 130.

⁷⁶ Cf. *Metaph.* Z 12, 1038 a 22-23.

⁷⁷ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 25-28; 3 b 5-7.

works): if N is an item's name or the *definiens* of its definition, then N applies to a universal U iff uttering the sentence obtained by substituting N for ' Φ ' in the schema 'It consists in being a'⁷⁸ Φ ' or in 'It consists in being Φ ' would constitute (at least part of) a true and appropriate answer to a question asked by uttering the interrogative sentence obtained by substituting the name of U for ' Ψ ' in the schema 'What does being a Ψ consist in?' or in 'What does being Ψ consist in?'⁷⁹. For instance, suppose a question were asked by uttering the interrogative sentence 'What does being a man consist in?' Then uttering the sentence 'It consists in being an animal', or 'It consists in being a substance which is able to perceive' (assuming that 'substance which is able to perceive' is the *definiens* of the definition of the genus animal)⁸⁰, or 'It consists in being biped', or 'It consists in being having two feet' would count as part of an appropriate and true answer. By contrast, uttering the sentence 'It consists in being capable of learning grammar', or 'It consists in being capable of learning the science of all utterances' (assuming that 'capable of learning the science of all utterances' is the *definiens* of the definition of the universal capable-of-learning-grammar)⁸¹, or 'It consists in being biped-ness', or 'It consists in being possession of two feet' (assuming that 'possession of two feet' is the *definiens* of the definition of the property biped-ness) would not count as even part of an appropriate and true answer. Thus: the words and phrases 'animal', 'substance which is able to perceive', 'biped', and 'having two feet' apply to the universal man, whilst 'capable of learning grammar', 'capable of learning the science of all utterances', 'biped-ness', and 'possession of two feet' don't. As a consequence, the genus animal and the universal biped are SAID OF the species man (because both the name and the *definiens* of the definition of each of them apply to the universal man), whilst the universals capable-of-learning-grammar and biped-ness are not SAID OF the species man (because for each of them it is not the case that both its name and the *definiens* of its definition apply).

Since there is no parallel problem about an item's name or definition applying (at a certain moment) to an individual, it follows that [1] provides a relatively straightforward explanation of what it is for an item to be SAID OF (at a certain moment) an individual. For instance, the universals animal, biped, man, pale, musical, just, etc. are all SAID OF the individual Socrates (at appropriate moments) because both the name and the *definiens* of the definition of each of them apply (at those moments) to Socrates (we are of course assuming that at the relevant moments Socrates is pale, musical, and just); by contrast, the properties biped-ness, paleness, musicality, justice, etc. are never SAID OF Socrates

⁷⁸ For reasons of euphony, the indefinite article may have to be 'an' rather than 'a'. Of course, indefinite articles would remain out of the picture if the language in which the questions are asked and answered were not English but ancient Greek, which has no indefinite article.

⁷⁹ The schema 'What does being a Ψ consist in?' is linked with questions Aristotle does ask in connection with essence: at the beginning of the *Categories* (1, 1 a 4-6, 1 a 9-12) he associates the account of the essence (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) that corresponds to the name 'animal' with indirect questions of the form 'what it is for x to be an animal'. The schema 'What does being a Ψ consist in?' might also be linked with Aristotle's formula for essence 'τί ἦν εἶναι' ('what it was to be') – if 'εἶναι' ('to be') is taken as predicative (cf. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, *Aristotle*, in EAD. - P.T. GEACH, *Three Philosophers*, Blackwell, Oxford 1961, pp. 1-63, in part. p. 34) rather than as existential (cf. H. WEIDEMANN, *In Defence of Aristotle's Theory of Predication*, «Phronesis», 25 [1980], pp. 76-87, in part. pp. 77-78).

⁸⁰ Cf. *Insomn.* 1, 454 b 24-25; *Juv.* 1, 467 b 24-25; 4, 469 b 4; *PA* 2.8, 653 b 22-23.

⁸¹ Cf. *Metaph.* Γ 2, 1003 b 20-21.

because for each of them it is never the case that both its name and the *definiens* of its definition apply to Socrates (however pale, musical, just, etc. he may ever be).

Two consequences of [1] are worth remarking. The first is that an individual is SAID OF nothing (for an individual has no definition⁸², so that it will never be the case that both the name and the *definiens* of the definition of an individual apply to anything). This first consequence of [1] is welcome: for there is independent evidence for attributing to Aristotle the view that individuals are SAID OF nothing. The second interesting consequence of [1] is that on the second approach to the relation of being SAID OF, so far as we restrict ourselves to universals, the relation of being SAID OF is essential predication, whilst when individuals come into the picture it is not essential predication. In this respect the second approach to the relation of being SAID OF yields the same result as the first.

Some characteristics of the relation of being SAID OF

The two approaches to the relation of being SAID OF of which there are hints in the *Categories* are probably best viewed as attempts at articulating the same intuition about what being SAID OF consists in rather than as full-fledged definitions: the issue of whether they capture the same relation does not arise in so far as they might well both be only partially successful in their attempt to articulate this common intuition. One point of apparent divergence between the two approaches should however be mentioned: the relation of being SAID OF captured by the first approach seems to be both irreflexive and asymmetric, whilst the one captured by the second approach seems to be neither (according to the second approach, whatever has both a name and a definition is SAID OF itself).

The foregoing considerations display two important features of being SAID OF. The first is that as long as we restrict ourselves to universals, being SAID OF *is* essential predication (if a universal is SAID OF another universal, then it is predicated essentially of it), whilst when we come to individuals, being SAID OF *is not* essential predication (if a universal is SAID OF an individual, it does not follow that it should be predicated essentially of it). The second important feature of being SAID OF displayed by the foregoing considerations is that how two universals relate at the level of their ‘extensions’ (i.e. at the level of the individuals which they are SAID OF) is to some degree independent of whether those universals are themselves SAID OF one another: a first universal’s being SAID OF all the individuals which a second universal is SAID OF does not entail the first universal’s being SAID OF the second (for instance, although the universal walking-animal is SAID OF every individual which the universal capable-of-learning-grammar is SAID OF, the universal walking-animal is not SAID OF the universal capable-of-learning-grammar)⁸³.

One fact about the *Categories* corroborates the foregoing account of being SAID OF. Aristotle’s expressions ‘to be said of a subject’ and ‘to be said of’ would be misleading

⁸² Cf. above, fn. 68.

⁸³ The interpretation of the relation of being SAID OF offered above is close to that proposed by Andronicus and some other unnamed ancient commentators (SIMP. *in Cat.* 54, 8-16, cf. P. MORAUX, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen: Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, de Gruyter, Berlin - New York 1973-1984, I, pp. 104-105; LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, p. 61) and to that put forward by DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle’s First Thoughts about Substances* (cf. ID., *Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle*, Reidel, Dordrecht - Boston 1975, p. 123; BRAKAS, *Aristotle’s Concept of the Universal*, pp. 9, 32, 52, 77-85; MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l’“Organon”*, p. 153).

if they were to express an 'ontologically loaded' relation like that of essential predication or that which links genera and species to those individuals which are their members⁸⁴. They are instead perfectly adequate if they are to express the relation which has been outlined in the foregoing paragraphs (a relation which obtains also between the universal musical and those primary substances that happen to be musical).

Why do most commentators identify being SAID OF with essential predication?

One reason is that most of the *Categories*'s general remarks and examples concerning the relation of being SAID OF mention genera, their species, and those individuals which are their members⁸⁵. This, however, is no conclusive evidence: it might simply be the case that genera, their species, and those individuals which are their members are particularly important in those classifications which play a central role in the *Categories*, and that this is why they are mentioned in most of the *Categories*'s examples and general remarks. As far as I can see, nothing in the *Categories* nails Aristotle down to the claim which might be formulated by a sentence like 'One item is SAID OF another just in case it is related to it either as a genus to a subordinate species or individual, or as a species to a subordinate individual, or as a *differentia* to a species it separates off or a further species or individual which is subordinate to that species'.

Another reason which might induce a commentator to identify being SAID OF with essential predication has to do with some points which Aristotle makes in the *Topics*. In *Topics* 4.1 he says:

T 7 The definition of partaking is 'admitting the account of what is partaken of'⁸⁶ (121 a 11-12).

Then, in *Topics* 5.4, he says:

T 8 Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he gave what is peculiar by way of participation: for then what is posited to be peculiar will not be peculiar. For what holds of something by way of participation contributes to its 'what it was to be': such an item would be some *differentia* said of some single species. For instance, since he who has said that walking-biped is peculiar to man gave what is peculiar by way of participation, walking-biped will not be peculiar to man (132 b 35-133 a 5).

T 7 and T 8 seem to commit Aristotle to the claim that if the *definiens* of the definition of one item applies to another item, then the first item is part of the second's 'what it was to be', i.e. is predicated essentially of the second item. But in the *Categories* Aristotle says that if one item is SAID OF another item then the *definiens* of the definition of the first applies to the second. All of this seems to commit Aristotle to the view that if one item is SAID OF another then it is predicated essentially of it

⁸⁴ I am not convinced by the suggestion (made by FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche*, p. 23) that the ancient Greek 'λέγεσθαι κατά', being connected in etymology and meaning with 'λόγος' (one of the *Categories*'s words for 'definition'), should connote a sort of material-mode defining, marking-out-the-nature-of.

⁸⁵ Cf. DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 352.

⁸⁶ The relation of being SAID OF entails the converse of the relation of participation. Perhaps the relation of being SAID OF is the converse of the relation of participation (cf. MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l'"Organon"*, p.171).

– which is just what the traditional interpretation needs. However, it is not unreasonable to interpret T 8 in such a way that its claim that «what holds of something by way of participation contributes to its ‘what it was to be’» (132 b 36–133 a 1) is limited to cases like the one on which the passage is concentrating, i.e. universals and what is peculiar to them. If this is correct, Aristotle’s view in T 8 agrees with the conception of the relation of being SAID OF which I attributed to him in a previous subsection: for, as I pointed out above, as long as we restrict ourselves to universals, the relation of being SAID OF is essential predication (it is when we come down to individuals that being SAID OF is not essential predication).

4. Paronymy

The three ‘onymies’

In *Categories* 1 Aristotle discusses three two-place relations: *homonymy*, *synonymy*, and *paronymy*.

[2] An item x is a homonym of an item y iff x and y share a name but the definitions according to which this shared name applies to x and y are different.

For instance, the eastern margin of the river Nile’s bed and the Bank of Scotland are homonyms because they share the name ‘bank’ but the definitions according to which this name applies to them are different⁸⁷.

[3] An item x is a synonym of an item y iff x and y share a name and the definition according to which this shared name applies to x is the same as the definition according to which it applies to y .

For instance, Barclays Bank and the Bank of Scotland are synonyms because they share the name ‘bank’ and the definitions according to which this name applies to them are the same⁸⁸.

[4] An item x is a paronym of an item y iff some name of x is a ‘concrete’ expression obtained by ‘inflection’ from some ‘abstract’ expression which is a name of y .

Thus, whatever (individual or universal) is named by a ‘concrete’ expression is a paronym of the property named by the ‘abstract’ expression of which the ‘concrete’ expression is an ‘inflection’⁸⁹.

⁸⁷ *Cat.* 1, 1 a 1–6; *Top.* 1.15, 107 a 18–21; 6.10, 148 a 23–26; 148 a 37–b 2; b 4–6; b 16–19 (cf. *Meteor.* 4.12, 390 a 10–13; *de An.* 2.1, 412 b 19–22; *PA* 1.1, 640 b 35–641 a 6; *GA* 2.1, 734 b 24–27; *Metaph.* A 9, 991 a 5–8; Z 10, 1035 b 24–25; I 10, 1059 a 13–14; *Pol.* 1.2, 1253 a 20–25; WEDIN, *The Strategy of Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 3; Id., *Aristotle’s Theory of Substance*, p. 12). Aristotle sometimes seems to use ‘homonymous’ (not for items to which the same name applies with different definitions, but) for the name which applies to different things with different definitions (cf. *Top.* 1.15, 107 a 5).

⁸⁸ *Cat.* 1, 1 a 6–12; 5, 3 a 33–b 9 (esp. b 7–8); *Top.* 2.2, 109 b 4–7; 3.3, 123 a 27–29; 6.10, 148 a 23–26; a 37–b 3; b 6–7; 7.4, 154 a 17–18 (cf. WEDIN, *Aristotle’s Theory of Substance*, p. 12). Aristotle sometimes uses ‘synonymous’ (not for items to which the same name applies with the same definition, but) for names which apply to whatever they apply to with the same definition (cf. *Top.* 1.15, 107 b 4; *SE* 5, 167 a 24).

⁸⁹ *Cat.* 1, 1 a 12–15; 7, 6 b 11–14 (< T 9); 8, 10 a 27–b 11; 9, 11 b 10–11; 10, 12 a 35–b 1 (> T 6); *Top.* 2.2, 109 b 1–12; 4, 111 a 33–b 4; 7.1, 151 b 28–33; *Phys.* 3.7, 207 b 8–10; 7.3, 245 b 9–12; *Metaph.* Z 1, 1028 a 10–31). It is worth emphasising that the relation of paronymy obtains not between linguistic expressions, but between the items named by linguistic expressions (Ross, *Aristotle. Physics*, pp. 559–560 mistakenly asserts that paro-

Universal paronyms

Some examples of paronymy can be retrieved from the following passage from *Categories* 7:

T 9 The following, too, are relatives: state, condition, perception, knowledge, and position. For each of the aforesaid items is called just what it is (and not something different) of something else: for state is called 'state' of something, knowledge 'knowledge' of something, position 'position' of something, and the rest similarly (6 b 2-5).

But reclining, standing, and sitting⁹⁰ are particular positions, and position is a relative: however, to-be-reclined,⁹¹ to-be-standing, or to-be-sitting themselves are not positions, but are said paronymously from the aforesaid positions⁹² (6 b 11-14).

In the first half of T 9 Aristotle remarks that position is a relative because it is called 'position' of something. In one respect, this remark is straightforward: Aristotle is pointing out that position is a relative because it satisfies the 'linguistic' definition of relatives he sets out at the beginning of *Categories* 7. But, in another respect, Aristotle's remark is puzzling. What he has in mind can hardly be that position is called 'position' of something because there must be some substance which has it: for, if this were what Aristotle has in mind, then he would be committed to the claim (which he would surely reject) that most items in any category other than substance should be relatives—for each of the relevant items would be 'called just what it is of something' because there would have to be some substance which has it⁹³. A plausible explanation of this puzzling aspect of Aristotle's remark can be achieved by considering a passage from *Categories* 8 (10 a 16-24) where Aristotle says that 'rare', 'dense', 'rough', and 'smooth' do not signify qualified items because each of them signifies a 'position of the parts' (10 a 19-20) (for instance, a thing is dense because its parts are close together)⁹⁴. So, Aristotle's remark that position is a relative because it is called 'position' of something should perhaps be understood bearing in mind how one would understand phrases like 'position of one's head' or 'position of one's limbs and torso', phrases which express properties which are genera whose species are narrower properties (one can have some position of one's limbs and torso just as one can have some colour). Reclining, standing, and sitting, which are mentioned in the second half of T 9, are species of the genus position, which is a relative (they are positions of one's limbs and torso and, perhaps, of the environment). However, they are not relatives: for, e.g., sitting is not called 'sitting' of something, or than something, or in any other way in relation to something. In this respect reclining, standing, and sitting are related to position just as grammatical-knowledge and musical-knowledge are to knowledge: grammatical-knowledge and musical-knowledge, which are not relatives but qualities, are species of the genus knowledge, which is a relative⁹⁵.

nymy obtains between linguistic expressions).

⁹⁰ Here 'reclining', 'standing', and 'sitting' should be regarded as English nouns (naming certain positions) rather than as verbs.

⁹¹ At 6 b 12 I read 'ἀνακεκλίσθαι' (with Minio-Paluello and Bodéüs). The main MSS have 'ἀνακεισθαι' (cf. 4, 2 a 2).

⁹² Cf. *Cat.* 9, 11 b 10-11, which however is probably an addition of an ancient ed.

⁹³ Cf. ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 99.

⁹⁴ Cf. 6, 4 b 21-22; 5 a 15-37.

⁹⁵ Cf. ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 99.

According to T 9, to-be-reclined, to-be-standing, and to-be-sitting (which must be universals named by the ‘concrete’ expressions ‘to be reclined’, ‘to be standing’, and ‘to be sitting’) are paronyms of reclining, standing, and sitting (which must be properties named by the corresponding ‘abstract’ expressions ‘reclining’, ‘standing’, and ‘sitting’). At *Categories* 4, 2 a 2-3⁹⁶ is-reclined and is-sitting are offered as examples of to-have-a-posture. Under the plausible assumption that is-reclined and is-sitting are the same (respectively) as to-be-reclined and to-be-sitting⁹⁷, it can be inferred that the universals to-be-reclined, to-be-standing, and to-be-sitting belong to the category to-have-a-posture. Perhaps the properties reclining, standing, and sitting also belong to the category to-have-a-posture⁹⁸.

So: the universals to-be-reclined, to-be-standing, and to-be-sitting are paronyms (respectively) of the properties reclining, standing, and sitting. Analogously, just individuals and the universal just will be paronyms of the property justice⁹⁹, and large individuals and the universal large of the property largeness. Some commentators think that paronymy obtains only between individuals and properties (e.g. between just individuals and justice) but cannot obtain between universals and properties (e.g. between the universal just and justice)¹⁰⁰. However, no passage postulates such a restriction to individuals, and T 9 seems to require that paronymy should obtain also between a universal (e.g. to-be-sitting and just) named by a ‘concrete’ expression (e.g. ‘to-be-sitting’ and ‘just’) and the property (e.g. sitting and justice) named by the ‘abstract’ expression (e.g. ‘sitting’ and ‘justice’) of which the ‘concrete’ expression is an ‘inflection’. It can then be plausibly inferred that to each property (like justice, largeness, triangularity, walkingness, biped-ness, etc.) corresponds a universal (like just, large, triangular, walking, biped, etc.) which in most cases is paronymous, but distinct, from it¹⁰¹.

How the three ‘-onymies’ interact with being SAID OF and being IN

Homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy interact in interesting ways with the relations of being SAID OF and being IN:

(i) If a property is IN some substance and the property’s name applies to the substance, then the property and the substance are homonymous (because the property’s definition will not apply to the substance, so that they will share a name but the definitions according to which this shared name applies to them will be different)¹⁰².

⁹⁶ Cf. 9, 11 b 10-11.

⁹⁷ In *Categories* 4 Aristotle moves freely between finite forms (‘ἀνάκειται’ at 2 a 2, ‘κάθεται’ at 2 a 3, ‘ὑποδέδεται’ at 2 a 3, and ‘ὄπισθισται’ at 2 a 3) and infinitives (‘τέμνειν’ at 2 a 4, ‘καίειν’ at 2 a 4, ‘τέμνεσθαι’ at 2 a 4, and ‘καίεσθαι’ at 2 a 4) (I owe this observation to Francesco Ademollo). The philological issue mentioned in fn. 91 above should also be borne in mind.

⁹⁸ Cf. the subsection to which fn.112 below is appended.

⁹⁹ *Cat.* 8, 10 b 12-15.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, pp. 72-73; ALLEN, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle’s Categories*, p. 368; B. JONES, *An Introduction to the First Five Chapters of Aristotle’s Categories*, «Phronesis», 20 (1975), pp. 146-172, in part. pp. 147-148; CODE, *Aristotle: Essence and Accident*, p. 423; FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche*, pp. 17-18; LOUX, *Primary Ousia*, p. 113.

¹⁰¹ As the qualifying phrase ‘in most cases’ indicates, there are exceptions: sometimes the universal corresponding to a certain property is not paronymous from it because it is not the case that it is named by some ‘concrete’ expression that is an ‘inflection’ of some ‘abstract’ expression which names the property (cf. *Cat.* 8, 10 a 32 - b 9).

¹⁰² Cf. *Phys.* 7.3, 245 b 16-246 a 1; ACKRILL, *Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione*, p. 72;

(ii) If a universal is SAID OF some item, then the two are synonymous (because both the name and the definition of the universal will apply to the item, so that they will share a name and the definitions according to which this shared name applies to them will be the same)¹⁰³.

(iii) Although no property is SAID OF any substance, still every property is IN some primary substance, and (apart from some exceptions) a corresponding universal, which in most cases is a paronym of it, is SAID OF that primary substance¹⁰⁴.

(iv) Here is an instance of (iii): though no quality is SAID OF any substance, still every quality is IN some primary substance, and (apart from some exceptions) a corresponding qualified item, which in most cases is a paronym of it, is SAID OF that primary substance¹⁰⁵.

(i)–(iv) show how deeply relevant *Categories* 1 is to its sequel.

5. Difficulties faced by the present interpretation

Why a 'crowded ontology'?

It might be objected that the theory outlined in the last paragraphs involves a point-less duplication of entities: since an item is just iff the property justice is IN it, what need is there for a universal just over and above the property justice¹⁰⁶?

I have only a very speculative explanation of why Aristotle might want an ontology which is crowded in that it contains universal paronyms over and above the properties of which they are paronyms. The explanation is based on the following passage from *Topics* 2.1:

T 10 In the case of what is incidental there is nothing to prevent its holding in some respect, e.g. whiteness or justice, so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice hold [of a man] in order to show that [he] is white or just: for it is open to dispute it and say that [he] is white or just in some respect (109 a 21-25).

JONES, *An Introduction to the First Five Chapters of Aristotle's Categories*, p. 148; V. CELLUPRICA, *Logica e semantica nella teoria aristotelica della predicazione*, «Phronesis», 32 (1987), pp. 166-187, in part. p. 173; LOUX, *Primary Ousia*, p. 19; MENN, *Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories*, p. 322; MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, pp. 54, 192-193.

¹⁰³ *Cat.* 5, 3 a 33-b 9; *Top.* 2.2, 109 b 4-7; 3.3, 123 a 27-29; 4.1, 121 a 10-14; 3, 123 a 27-29; 6, 127 b 5-7; 7.4, 154 a 17-18 (cf. JONES, *An Introduction to the First Five Chapters of Aristotle's Categories*, pp. 147-148; FURTH, *Substance, Form and Psyche*, p. 24; LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, pp. 59-60; LOUX, *Primary Ousia*, p. 19; GRANGER, *Aristotle on Genus and Differentia*, p. 73; MANN, *The Discovery of Things*, pp. 54, 191).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Cat.* 10, 12 a 35-b 1 (> T 6); DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, pp. 349-352, 361-362; S.C. HETHERINGTON, *A Note on Inherence*, «Ancient Philosophy», 4 (1984), pp. 218-223, in part. pp. 219-220.

¹⁰⁵ For the distinction between qualities and qualified items, cf. *Cat.* 8, 10 a 27-11 a 14 (cf. 4, 1 b 26; b 29; 5, 3 b 18-19; DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 361). This distinction runs parallel to that between the uses of 'relative' whereby it applies, on the one hand, to the equal, the similar, etc., and, on the other hand, to equality, similarity, etc., i.e. those properties «by virtue of which what has them is called 'relative'» (*Metaph.* Δ 15, 1021b6-7). The distinction between qualities and qualified items also runs parallel to that between quantities (ποσότητες) and quantified items (ποσόν) (cf. *Metaph.* Z 3, 1029 a 14-15, with DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 365). As for qualified items being SAID OF primary substances, consider that walking, biped, and many other *differentiae* are qualified items and are SAID OF primary substances.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l'«Organon»*, pp. 167-168.

Jones behaves justly every Tuesday afternoon – but the rest of the time he behaves as unjustly as anyone. The property justice therefore holds of Jones in some respect or degree, so that it holds of him ('If Φ ness holds of α in some respect or degree, then Φ ness holds of α ' is a valid schema). However, although Jones is just in some respect or degree, he certainly is not just ('If α is Φ in some respect or degree, then α is Φ ' is not a valid schema)¹⁰⁷. Under the plausible assumption that justice holds of Jones iff it is IN him¹⁰⁸, it follows that justice is IN Jones but Jones is not just.

It follows that it would be wrong to give the truth conditions of the sentence 'Jones is just' by requiring that it should count as true iff the property justice is IN Jones. Now, this does not yet require one to assume universal paronyms in one's ontology: one might still give truth conditions for the sentence 'Jones is just' which do not presuppose universal paronyms – one might simply postulate that 'Jones is just' should count as true iff justice is IN Jones in the respects and degree which are appropriate to being just. But then one might feel some uneasiness at the context-dependence of the notion of being IN *in the appropriate respects and degree*: the respects and degree appropriate for the being IN of justice will probably differ from those appropriate for the being IN of sleepiness, so that the relation (being IN in respects r and degree d) which corresponds to the 'is' of 'Jones is just' will be different from the relation (being IN in respects r' and degree d') which corresponds to the 'is' of 'Jones is sleepy'. In order to avoid this kind of context-dependence of the ontological relation that corresponds to the copula 'is', one natural move is to introduce universal paronyms over and above properties. The extra universal just – paronymous, but distinct, from the property justice – 'extends' precisely over those items which are just: it is not SAID OF all those items which the property justice is IN, rather it is SAID OF only those items which the property justice is IN in the respects and degree which are appropriate to being just. One can now postulate that the sentence 'Jones is just' should count as true iff the universal just is SAID OF Jones (and that 'Jones is sleepy' should count as true iff the universal sleepy is SAID OF Jones). If this explanation is correct, we see that the objection formulated in the penultimate paragraph is based on a false assumption: it is *not* the case that an item is just iff the property justice is IN it (the right-to-left direction of this biconditional fails), and universal paronyms cannot be regarded as a pointless *duplication* of the properties of which they are paronyms.

Where are universal paronyms located within the categorial scheme?

The close link of universal paronyms to those properties of which they are paronyms makes it likely that they should be classified together with them: that, for instance, the category of quality should comprise not only the properties (qualities) colour and courage, but also the universals (qualified items) coloured and courageous which are paronyms of them¹⁰⁹. One passage from Simplicius' commentary on the

¹⁰⁷ Cf. SE 5, 166 b 37-167 a 20; 25, 180 a 23-b 39; P. SŁOMKOWSKI, *Aristotle's Topics*, Brill, Leiden - New York - Köln 1997, pp. 136-137.

¹⁰⁸ A property (like justice) can only be IN a substance (it cannot be SAID OF it).

¹⁰⁹ Cf. DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 369; CODE, *Aristotle's Response to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic*, p. 179; BRAKAS, *Aristotle's Concept of the Universal*, pp. 32-33. LEWIS, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle*, p. 91 denies that paronyms should fall under the same category as the properties from which they are paronyms, whilst MORRISON, *Le statut catégoriel des*

Categories, which reports views expounded by Aristotle in writings that are now lost, may be so interpreted as to provide some support for this suggestion:

T 11 But under which [*sc.* category] will negations, privations, and the various inflections of verbs be classified? Aristotle himself answered this question in his notes: for in his *Methodics*¹¹⁰, in his *Divisions*, and in another set of notes entitled *On Language*¹¹¹ (which, even if it is thought by some not to be a genuine work of Aristotle, is at all events the work of some member of the school) – in these, after introducing the categories, he adds ‘I mean these with their cases’, i.e. inflections, and he connects his exposition of them with negations, privations, and indefinite terms¹¹² (65, 2-10).

Several interpretations of T 11 are possible. On some of these interpretations the passage says nothing relevant to the question of the position of universal paronyms within the categorial scheme. However, on at least one of its interpretations T 11 provides evidence which contributes to answering this question. Observe the term ‘case’, which is used in T 11 (at 65, 8): it is employed also in the definition of paronymy at *Categories* 1, 1 a 13¹¹³. If in T 11 ‘case’ denotes not derived linguistic expressions (like the adjective ‘courageous’, derived from the noun ‘courage’), but what is signified by derived linguistic expressions (like the universal courageous, signified by the derived linguistic expression ‘courageous’), then at least part of the claim which T 11 attributes to Aristotle is that universal paronyms belong to the same category as those properties of which they are paronyms. Some support for interpreting T 11’s ‘case’ as denoting what is signified by derived linguistic expressions (rather than the derived linguistic expressions themselves) comes from the circumstance that the categories classify not linguistic expressions but the items which they signify.

The presence of universal paronyms in the categorial scheme generates a difficulty for one of the arguments offered by Aristotle for awarding the title ‘substance’ to the species and genera of primary substances. The argument, which is presented at 2 b 37-3 a 6 (= T 4), was discussed earlier¹¹⁴. It relies on the assumption that every non-substantial item is either SAID OF or IN some species or some genus of primary substances. However, once universal paronyms are allowed in the categorial scheme, this assumption becomes problematic. For instance, the universal paronym to-be-standing appears to be neither SAID OF any species or genus of primary substances (otherwise every individual in the species or genus would be standing) nor IN any species or genus of primary substances (because it is not the type of thing that can be IN anything). As far as I can see, the only way of solving this difficulty is to

différences dans l’“Organon”, pp. 153-154 cautiously avoids taking a position on the issue of the location of paronyms within the categorial scheme.

¹¹⁰ At 65, 5 I read ‘ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν’ with some of the witnesses. Other witnesses (followed by Ross) have instead ‘ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν’.

¹¹¹ At 65, 6 I read ‘ἐπιγραφή τὰ περὶ’ with some of the witnesses. Other witnesses (followed by Ross) have instead ‘ἐπιγράφεται παρὰ’.

¹¹² T 11 is part of fr. 770 Gigon (776 b 1-13). Cf. DEXIPP, in *Cat.* 33, 8–21 (= fr. 771 Gigon 776 b 27-47); DANCY, *On Some of Aristotle’s First Thoughts about Substances*, p. 369; BRAKAS, *Aristotle’s Concept of the Universal*, pp. 32-33.

¹¹³ In several passages Aristotle uses ‘case’ in connection with expressions which stand for paronymous items: *Top.* 4.3, 124 a 10-14; 7.1, 151 b 30-33; 3, 153 b 25-29; *Rhet.* 1.7, 1364 b 34-37; 3.9, 1410 a 32-33.

¹¹⁴ Cf. above, text to fn. 17.

allow more species in the ontology than one would expect: for every universal paronym and every given species of primary substances (of the appropriate sort), there is a further subordinate species of primary substances generated by using the given species as genus and the universal paronym as a *differentia*. This will yield a species of primary substances which the original universal paronym is SAID OF. For instance, there will be a species standing-man which the universal paronym to-be-standing is SAID OF. It must however be admitted that one will be wary of crediting Aristotle with an ontological picture of this sort: the ontology of the *Categories* seems to leave no place for a species standing-man.

In conclusion, the alternative exegesis of the relation of being SAID OF developed in the foregoing pages also faces some difficulties. It is hard to decide what to say with respect to Aristotle's own view. One possibility is that Aristotle is simply inconsistent: contradictions are entailed which he failed to spot. Another possibility is that the alleged examples of the relation of being SAID OF that conflict with the most widespread exegesis should be brushed aside by assuming either that they are not there in the text (after all, unearthing them required a remarkable amount of exegetical work, which could have involved some mistake) or that they belong to a later stage of Aristotle's thought or indeed are not his at all (note that the two main passages, T 5 and T 6, lie within chapter 10 of the *Categories*, and therefore belong to a section of the work whose authenticity has been doubted).

Abstract

The ontology of the *Categories* relies on several fundamental relations that obtain between beings. One of these is the relation of being-said-of. The most widespread view among commentators is that the relation of being-said-of amounts to essential predication. However, some relatively neglected textual evidence tells against such an interpretation and points towards a different account of the relation of being-said-of. On this alternative picture, while the relation of being-said-of is essential predication when it obtains between universals, it coincides with mere predication when it obtains between a universal and an individual. The relation of being-said-of turns out to be closely linked with paronymy: in most cases where a property (e.g. generosity) is in an individual, a paronymous universal (e.g. generous) is said of that individual. However, the alternative picture also faces difficulties. In conclusion, it remains unclear what position, if any, can be coherently attributed to Aristotle.

Keywords: Aristotle, *Categories*, Ontology, Predication, Paronymy