Concorrenza di prezzo, essenzialita` ed esternalita` di rete in presenza di beni complementari: nuove soluzioni alla «Tragedia degli Anticommons
| RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2008 - 3
The presence of multiple sellers in the provision of (non-substitutable) complementary goods
leads to outcomes that are worse than those generated by an integrated monopoly, a problem also
known as the «tragedy of the anticommons». In this paper we identify some conditions under which
the tragedy is resolved and under which a complementary oligopoly is preferable to a multiproduct
monopoly. First, we introduce several substitutes for each complement and determine their minimum
number for the result to hold. Second, we study asymmetric complementarity and the presence of
essential goods, stressing the role of the degree of differentiation across substitutes for the persistence
of the «double mark-up» problem. Third, we verify whether the inefficiency result holds in dynamic
terms, discussing the adoption of new technological standards in complementary oligopolies.
The focus will be on indirect network externalities, checking under which conditions an inefficient
standard emerges or the market becomes «locked in» in an old standard.