

ILARIA RAMELLI

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE HOUSEHOLD THEORY
BETWEEN ROMAN STOICISM, MIDDLE-PLATONISM,
AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY

I shall here investigate the household theme in Roman Stoicism, especially in Hierocles and the Etruscan Musonius Rufus, in the context of the recent reassessment of the philosophical importance of the Roman Stoics, due *e.g.* to Gretchen Reydams-Schils¹, and of the general re-evaluation of Roman philosophy². I shall explore the relationship of this theme with the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις, and clarify the development of the household conception in Roman Stoicism as compared to previous Stoic views, in relation to the transformation of the Stoic doctrine of the goods, the indifferents, and the καθήκοντα, “duties” or better “appropriate acts”³.

¹ G. REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics. Self, Responsibility, and Affection*, Chicago 2005, and the review by I. RAMELLI, «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica», 98 (2006), pp. 605-610.

² Thanks especially to Miriam Griffin (*Seneca: a Philosopher in Politics*, Oxford 1976, 1992²; *Philosophia Togata*, Oxford 1997² [written with J. Barnes]; *Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Essays M. Griffin*, ed. G. CLARK - T. RAJAK, Oxford 2002), Jonathan Barnes (*Logic in the Imperial Stoa*, Leiden 1997), Mark Morford (*The Roman Philosophers*, London 2002, esp. pp. 1-13 for methodological assessments; the rest of the book is devoted to the historical analysis; for the Roman Stoics see pp. 161-239) and other scholars. The imperial period, in which both Latin and Greek philosophy are present together, was recently studied by M. TRAPP, *Philosophy in the Roman Empire. Ethics, Politics, and Society*, Aldershot 2007.

³ A.A. LONG - D. SEDLEY, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1987, sections 58-59, part. vol. I, pp. 358-359, translate *kathêkonta* with “proper functions”, and so does D. SEDLEY, *The Stoic-Platonist Debate on kathêkonta*, in K. IERODIAKONOU (ed.), *Topics in*

Attention will be paid, in this connection, to the high appreciation of Musonius' ethical thought on the part of early Christian authors, particularly Clement of Alexandria, who deeply admired his family ethics and, from the philosophical point of view, was close to both Middle-Platonism and Roman Stoicism. In this connection, both the Middle-Platonist Plutarch and the ancient novels, compared to the Roman Stoics and Clement, will finally offer very interesting hints.

The household theme in Stoicism did not emerge at the very beginning, in Zeno, for whom the sage is indeed a good οἰκονομικός (SVF I 216), but only in a most general sense, in that he should be able to "do everything well, even cook lentils" (SVF II 217). Zeno, in his *Republic*, did not admit of any household, since he supported communalism⁴, which Chrysippus did not reject in principle (SVF III 743-746 and 728) – although he does not accept adultery in established States (SVF III 729) –, whereas later Stoics did reject it, as Philodemus attests (*On the Stoics*, col. XIV, 4ff.). It is in the so-called Middle Stoicism⁵, with its transformations in the evaluation of καθήκοντα, and, even more, in Roman Stoicism that the theme of household and marriage is addressed with close attention.

The relationship between the household theme and the Stoic οἰκείωσις is particularly evident in Hierocles the Stoic⁶, who, in the early imperial age, no later than the middle of the II cent. AD, wrote both a technical treatment of the doctrine of οἰκείωσις preserved in a papyrus (Ἡθικὴ στοιχειώσις, *Elements of Ethics*) and ethical reflections fragmentarily transmitted by Stobaeus and mostly dealing with family and duties: sections are devoted to duties toward the gods, one's homeland, one's parents, relatives, siblings, spouse, each under the rubric πῶς χρῆστέον⁷. They derive from

Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1999, pp. 128-152, esp. pp. 130-133; T. BRENNAN, *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate*, Oxford 2005, pp. 169-230 renders "the befitting".

⁴ See R. RADICE, *Oikeiosis*, Milano 2000, pp. 63-75 for some mitigation of Zeno's (and Chrysippus') view.

⁵ This very category has been called into question by D. SEDLEY, *The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus*, in B. INWOOD (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, Cambridge 2003, ch. 1: see my review in «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scholastica», 97 (2005), pp. 152-158.

⁶ On this philosopher of the I-II cent. AD see documentation in my *Hierocles the Stoic*, forthcoming. The edition of his *Elements of Ethics* is provided by G. Bastianini and A.A. Long in CPF, I 1**, Florence 1992, pp. 268-362. On his fragments preserved by Stobaeus see I. RAMELLI, *The Neo-Stoic Hierocles in Stobaeus: Kathêkonta and the Evolution of Stoic Ethics*, in G. REYDAMS-SCHILS (ed.), *Deciding Culture: Stobaeus' Collection of Excerpts of Ancient Greek Authors*, Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, 5th-8th March 2008, forthcoming in Turnhout.

⁷ TH. BÉNATOUÏL, *Faire usage: la pratique du stoïcisme*, Paris 2006, esp. pp. 270-278

Hierocles' *On Duties* (Περὶ καθηκόντων), which probably included, as thematic units, the excerpts Περὶ Γάμου and on household management (Οἰκονομικός). In one of these excerpts (Stob. IV 671-673 H.) is the famous image of the concentric circles designating the degrees of οἰκείωσις, starting from one's self and body, passing through one's family and city, and ending with the whole of humanity – or even the highest society constituted by all humans and gods, the “City of Zeus”⁸. Both Reydams-Schils and Zagdoun rightly allow a significant role for οἰκείωσις in the passage between personal ἀυτάρχεια and social bonds for the Stoic sage⁹. Now, one of the most important of such bonds involves marriage and family. Martha Nussbaum¹⁰ also observes a deep relationship between the Stoics' ethical thought on love and family and their theory of οἰκείωσις¹¹.

for the Stoic conception of the relationships (or the “usage”) with other human beings. On the household theme in Hierocles cfr. C.P. BALOGLU, *Hai oikonomikai antilêpseis tôn Stôikôn Hierokleous kai Mousôniou*, «Platon», 44 (1992), pp. 122-134; ID., *He Oikonomikê skêpsis tôn arkhaiôn Hellênôn*, Thessaloniki 1995.

⁸ D. OBBINK, *The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City*, in K. IERODIAKONOU, *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford 1999, pp. 178-195; my *La Città di Zeus di Musonio Rufo*, «Stylos», 11 (2002), pp. 151-158; REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 70-71, 106-107; my *Le origini della filosofia: greche o barbare? L'enigmatico mito del Boristenitico di Dione*, «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica», 99 (2007), pp. 185-214.

⁹ REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 53-82; M.-A. ZAGDOUN, *Problèmes concernant l'oikeiôsis stoïcienne*, in G. ROMEYER-DHERBEY - J.-B. GOURINAT (eds.), *Les Stoïciens*, Paris 2005, pp. 319-334, who focusses on the relationship between self-oriented and other-oriented *oikeiôsis*.

¹⁰ NUSSBAUM, *Erôs and Ethical Norms*, pp. 78-85.

¹¹ On which see B. INWOOD, *Comments on Prof. Görgemanns' Paper: The Two Forms of Oikeiôsis in Arius and the Stoa*, in W.W. FORTENBAUGH (ed.), *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, New Brunswick 1983, pp. 190-201; A.A. LONG, *Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics*, in FORTENBAUGH, *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics*, pp. 41-65; G. STRIKER, *The Role of Oikeiôsis in Stoic Ethics*, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 1 (1983), pp. 145-167; B. INWOOD, *Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the II Cent. AD*, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 2 (1984), pp. 151-184; T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, *Discovering the Good: Oikeiôsis and kathêkonta in Stoic Ethics*, in M. SCHOFIELD - G. STRIKER (eds.), *The Norms of Nature. Studies in Hellenistic Ethics*, Cambridge 1986, pp. 145-183; G. SCHÖNRICH, *Oikeiôsis. Zur Aktualität eines stoischen Grundbegriffs*, «Philosophisches Jahrbuch», 96 (1989), pp. 34-51; T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeiôsis. Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy*, Aarhus 1990; M.W. BLUNDELL, *Parental Nature and Stoic Oikeiôsis*, «Ancient Philosophy», 10 (1990), pp. 221-242; B. INWOOD, *L'Oikeiôsis sociale chez Épictète*, in K.A. ALGRA - P.W. VAN DEN HORST - D.T. RUNIA, *Polyhistor: Studies J. Mansfeld*, Leiden 1996, pp. 243-264; RADICE, *Oikeiôsis*; C.-U. LEE, *Oikeiôsis: Stoische Ethik in naturphilosophischer Perspektive*, Freiburg 2002; G. REYDAMS-SCHILS, *Human Bonding and oikeiôsis in Roman Stoicism*, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 2 (2002), pp. 221-251; R. BEES, *Die Oikeiôsislehre der Stoa, I, Rekonstruktion ihres Inhaltes*,

This is manifest, I find, in Hierocles. The treatment of οἰκείωσις as expounded by him in the *Elements* addresses the problem of interpersonal relationships, which he analyses in his work *Περὶ καθήκοντων*. Thus, he is in line with Porphyry, *Abst.* 3.19 (SVF I 197), where οἰκείωσις is described as a principle of justice according to the Stoics, a theory that was attacked by the Middle-Platonic *Commentary on the Theaetetus*, col. V, 24.

In fact, I find that precisely the social οἰκείωσις, which grounds interpersonal relationships with one's family, friends, and society, as the natural prolongation of the relationship with one's self, can act as a mediator in respect to the rigorous classification of beloved persons among ἀδιάφορα, and also among "external" goods: the beloved are no longer mere ἀδιάφορα, but "preferable" ἀδιάφορα and objects of "appropriate acts"; they are no longer exterior goods, but they come closer to the goods of the soul, formally restricted only to virtue, the only true good recognized by the Stoics, in that it is entirely rational¹². The affective disposition itself becomes intrinsic to reason¹³ in the conception of the so-called associative or (in Brad Inwood's definition) social οἰκείωσις. This transition is particularly evident, to my mind, precisely in Hierocles, although I find that he certainly has a precursor in Antipater, who actually belonged to Middle Stoicism, albeit his fragments appear in Arnim's collection, and who wrote a treatise *On Marriage* partially preserved by Stobaeus¹⁴ (fr. 63, SVF III, pp. 254-257). Here, he includes marriage among "the most necessary and important appropriate acts [καθήκοντα]". Hierocles too, at the very beginning of his treatise *On Marriage* (*ap. Stob. Anth.* III 22, p. 7.13 M.), defines marriage as a καθήκον and a preferable.

The doctrine of καθήκοντα, as distinct from κατορθώματα, is attested already for Zeno (SVF I 230: καθήκον as "an act that is appropriate [οἰκείον] to constitutions in accord with nature"). It was Panaetius, however, a Middle-Stoic, who deepened the conception of καθήκοντα by linking it to a reassessment of the ἀδιάφορα. Hierocles seems to follow Panaetius' tendency to mitigate the ideal of ἀπάθεια so to make it com-

Würzburg 2004, esp. pp. 186-198 for the relationship between this doctrine and ethic thought on household; B. GUCKES, *Zur Ethik der älteren Stoa*, Göttingen 2004; T. BRENNAN, *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate*, Oxford 2005, pp. 154-169; ZAGDOUN, *Problèmes*, pp. 319-334.

¹² It is the Old-Stoic view, to my mind, that is expounded by BÉNATOUÏL, *Faire usage*, pp. 271-275, when he says that the other persons, even the beloved, are mere indifferents and cannot represent any good *per se*: they may be valuable only as objects of proper social interaction.

¹³ See also REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, p. 75.

¹⁴ See *ibi*, pp. 65-66.

patible with that of deontological and rational οἰκείωσις. Particular attention should be paid to the category of “preferred indifferents” or “preferables” (προηγμένα), and to the election (ἐκλογή) of such indifferents¹⁵, as distinct from the choice (αἴρεσις) of true goods (ἀγαθά), whose axiological value is absolute. A Stobaeian fragment (SVF I 192 = III 128) reports the Stoic definition of a preferable as “that which we elect for ourselves [ἐκλεγόμεθα] in accord with a criterion of preferability [κατὰ προηγούμενον λογόν]”, and indeed this criterion was first included by Antipater in the definition of the Stoic τέλος in fr. 57 (SVF III, pp. 252-253): “to live selecting [ἐκλεγόμενους] what is according to nature and rejecting [ἀπεκλεγόμενους] what is against nature” and “to do all that we can ... in order to obtain the things that are preferable [προηγούμενων] according to nature”¹⁶. The ἐκλογή (SVF III 118) is present also in the definition of the Stoic τέλος by Diogenes of Babylon, a precursor of Middle Stoicism like Antipater (SVF III ii 46), and Archedemus of Tarsus (SVF III v 121), who at the same time first connected this very τέλος with the καθήκοντα by defining it “to live fulfilling all one’s duties” (SVF III v 18-19), rather than having it consist in the fulfilling of the κατορθώματα, which derive from choosing (αἰρέω) absolute goods (ἀγαθά).

Hierocles uses ἐκλογή in the Stobaeian extracts to indicate the “election of duties” or the preference given to these, and in the *Elements of Ethics* he employs ἐκλεκτικῶς to designate a kind of οἰκείωσις “based on the election of preferables” in regard to external things. He theorized an ἐκλεκτικὴ οἰκείωσις, belonging to animals too and directed to external realities, which should be “appropriated” whenever they are preferable, and a αἰρετικὴ οἰκείωσις, the rational choice of true goods, belonging to humans only. He applied the distinction between αἴρεσις and ἐκλογή to the theory of οἰκείωσις, which further makes it clear that he closely linked the doctrine of οἰκείωσις to that of καθήκοντα.

This deep connection is particularly evident in Hierocles’ fragments concerning marriage and household and in Musonius, who tended to assimilate the bond of marriage to that of friendship between wise persons, not assigning only the latter to the αἴρεσις of ἀγαθά, nor confining only the former to the inferior ἐκλογή of preferred things, ἀδιάφορα deprived of

¹⁵ On which see BÉNATOUÏL, *Faire usage*, p. 241.

¹⁶ RADICE, *Oikeiōsis*, pp. 202-205; M. SORETH, *Die zweite Telosformel des Antipater*, «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», 50 (1968), pp. 48-72; M.E. REESOR, *The Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy*, London 1985, p. 110ff.; G. STRIKER, *Antipater or the Art of Living*, in SCHOFIELD - STRIKER (eds.), *The Norms of Nature*, pp. 185-204; B. INWOOD, *Goal and Target in Stoicism*, «Journal of Philosophy», 10 (1986), pp. 547-556, in part. p. 551.

the axiological status of goods. Hierocles *ap.* Stob. *Anth.* III, p. 8.19ff. M., describes the nuptial bond as according to nature and also as καλόν, a term that is close to ἀγαθόν insofar as it means “fine in the ethical sense”. And he includes both friendship and marriage, at the same level, among the καθήκοντα, not friendship among the goods vs. marriage among the preferables and “appropriate actions”. He considers marriage to be a κοινωνία in all things, up to bodies and souls (Stob. III, p. 8.19ff. M.), aimed not only at procreation but also at ὁμόνοια and φιλία: he applies to marriage the terminology that the Old Stoics applied to friendship between wise men. Antipater had already claimed in fr. 63 that marriage is a complete fusion (κρᾶσις) of the spouses, who “share their wealth, their children, their souls, and also their bodies”, whereas *e.g.* Ischomachus, who represents the traditional classical attitude to marriage, in his discussion with Socrates¹⁷ in Xen. *Oec.* 7, 11-13 and 29 only speaks of sharing children and wealth.

Also in applying to marriage a terminology and a constellation of conceptions that was formally reserved only for friendship, it seems to me that Hierocles had a precursor in Antipater, who in *On Marriage*, fr. 63 SVF III 256, although speaking only from the perspective of a man, defines the wife as an *alter ego* (ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον) of her husband, adding that “there is no difference whether this *alter ego* is feminine or masculine”. More than once, Hierocles equates the bond of friendship between wise persons, based on *logos* and tending to virtue in a continual προκοπή – according to the fundamental ideal stressed by Panaetius in Middle-Stoicism and taken over in Roman Stoicism and Middle-Platonism –¹⁸, with the natural bond obtaining between two siblings and between parents and children, and with that obtaining between spouses, which too is elective and aims at virtue. For what counts now is progress toward virtue, and consequently the gap between the wise and the others is less stressed. Although the end of the last column of the *Elements of Ethics* is devoted to friendship and its formation, within the discussion of the kinds of οἰκείωσις, Hierocles does not emphasize the bond of the wise among themselves, which played such an important role in the Old Stoa, where true friendship was only that between wise and virtuous men (SVF III 631). The description of friend-

¹⁷ J. DILLON, *Salt and Olives. Morality and Custom in Ancient Greece*, Edinburgh 2004, p. 14ff.

¹⁸ See above all G. ROSKAM, *On the Path to Virtue. The Stoic Doctrine of Moral Progress and its Reception in (Middle-)Platonism*, Leuven 2005, reviewed by R. BROUWER, «The Classical Review», 57 (2007), pp. 73-75; for this idea in Seneca see B. INWOOD, *Reading Seneca. Stoic Philosophy at Rome*, Oxford 2005, pp. 271-301, with the review by G. REYDAMS-SCHILS, «Phoenix», 61 (2007), pp. 186-189.

ship in fr. 631, “κοινωνία of life”, is applied by Hierocles to the relationship obtaining between spouses, just as Hierocles ascribes to marriage the *ὁμόνοια* that the Old Stoics reserved only for friendship between wise men (SVF III 630; 625). In fr. 631, the statement that “a friend is choiceworthy [αἰρετός] in himself, and that having many friends is a good [ἀγαθόν]” reveals that in the Old Stoa friendship was placed among the goods, not among the indifferents, which may be object not of choice, but of preference. But Hierocles (Stob. III, p. 730.17 H.) puts friends after family, and in several other passages he seems to locate the bond of friendship between the wise on the same level as that between spouses, siblings, and parents and children. In III, p. 8.19ff. M. he even claims that it is absurd to seek friends as allies and not a wife and children in a relation that is according to nature.

The tendency to a certain equality, even if not without differentiations, is clear in one of the many passages devoted by Hierocles to family “appropriate acts” (Stob. III, p. 134.1 M.): “One should grant more love to one’s mother and more honor to one’s father”. This trend seems to have its roots in Socrates, according to the interpretation of John Dillon¹⁹: at the end of Ischomachus’ discourse on household, which is informed by the principle of a differentiation of the *ἀρεταί* between men and women and the preconception that the husband should order and the wife should obey, Socrates ridicules this conception by exclaiming: “Your wife has an *ἀνδρικὴν διάνοιαν!*” (*Oec.* 10, 1). In *Mem.* 2.3.5ff. Socrates shows a deep consideration for wives and their sacrifice in bearing and raising children. It is from him that Plato, like the Stoics, derived the conviction of the identity of *ἀρετή* of men and women. In *Xen. Oec.* 3, 12 Socrates affirms that in a household “the wife has the same importance as the husband in respect to the common good”, because the income usually depends on the husband’s activity, but the expenses depend on the wife’s administration. In 7, 3 Ischomachus, a good husband, but full of prejudices, endowed with what Dillon defines a “paternalistic” attitude toward his wife²⁰, is induced to admit that she, whom he married when she was not yet fifteen, and to whom he taught all that is useful for a household, is perfectly capable of managing theirs.

Hierocles endorses the traditional division of roles in a household (to the husband tasks concerning fields, marketplaces, and city business, to the wife those relating to the spinning of wool, bread-making, and domestic tasks), but soon after he adds that a man who is confident in his masculin-

¹⁹ DILLON, *Salt and Olives*, pp. 14-15. I think that he is likely to be right.

²⁰ *Ibi*, p. 14.

ity and does not have it depend on external prejudice can tranquilly accomplish works that are considered feminine, such as weaving, and a woman, in turn, works that are considered masculine, such as overseeing the laborers in the field, drawing water, harvesting, etc. In this way, the spouses will share their tasks entirely and will reinforce the *κοινωνία* that is fundamental in a marriage (Stob. III, p. 150.6 M.).

Antipater in his *On Marriage* (fr. 63 SVF III, p. 256) puts the instruction concerning *οἰκονομία* in the first place among the most important ones that a husband ought to offer to his wife, even before the increment of the *οἶκος* – already identified by Ischomachus in Xen. *Oec.* 7, 15 and 19-20 as the first task of spouses together with the begetting of babies – and the veneration of gods. Moreover, according to circumstances and the commitments of the husband, Antipater advises him to delegate the whole household management (*οἰκονομία*) to his wife: if he loves study and tranquility, it will be a blessing for him to have a wife as an *οἰκονόμος*. Of course, all is in the service of the husband's interests, not of the wife's inclinations or wishes, but it is significant that Antipater deems it good that the whole *οἰκονομία* may be managed by the wife.

Musonius Rufus²¹, “the Roman Socrates”, basing his theorization of household ethics on theology – not unlike his contemporary s. Paul, who, however, extolled celibacy far more than marriage –²², declared, not with-

²¹ Ed. O. HENSE, *C Musonii Rufi Reliquiae*, Leipzig 1905, 1990²; A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Deux prédicateurs de l'antiquité*, Paris 1978; C. LUTZ, *Musonius Rufus, the Roman Socrates*, «Yale Classical Studies», 10 (1947), pp. 3-147; A. VAN GEYTENBEEK, *Musonius and Greek Diatribe*, Assen 1963; R. LAURENTI, *Musonio. Diatribe e i frammenti minori*, Roma 1967; G. BALDASSARE, *Osservazioni sui Memorabili di Musonio*, «Prometheus», 4 (1978), pp. 276-280; D. TSEKOURAKIS, *Dialogue dans la diatribe*, «Hellenica», 32 (1980), pp. 61-78; W. CAPELLE, *Dir selber treu*, Zürich 1986; I. RAMELLI, *Il perdono in Seneca e in Musonio*, in *Responsabilità, perdono e vendetta nel mondo antico*, Milano 1998, pp. 191-207; EAD., *Stoicismo e Cristianesimo in area siriana*, «Silenio», 25 (1999), pp. 197-212; D.A. CHRISTIDIS, *Ena neo apospasma tou Mousoniou*, «Hellenica», 50 (2000), pp. 343-346; I. RAMELLI, *Musonio Rufo: Diatribe, frammenti e testimonianze*, Milano 2001; MORFORD, *The Roman Philosophers*, pp. 189-201; I. RAMELLI, *Musonio Rufo, Caio*, in V. MELCHIORRE (dir.), *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, Milano 2006³, VIII, pp. 7696-7697; EAD., *Stoicismo Romano Minore*, Milano 2008, section on Musonius Rufus.

²² R.B. WARD, *Musonius and Paul on Marriage*, «New Testament Studies», 36 (1990), pp. 281-289; cfr. P.W. V.D. HORST, *Musonius and the New Testament*, «Novum Testamentum», 16 (1974), pp. 306-315. On Paul's ethics and Stoic ethics on family and household see W. DEMING, *Paul on Marriage and Celibacy. The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7*, Cambridge 1994; B. MARTIN, *Paul without Passion*, in H. MOXNES (ed.), *Constructing Early Christian Families. Family as Social Reality and Metaphor*, London 1997, pp. 201-215; O.L. YARBROUGH, *Paul, Marriage, and Divorce*, in J.P. SAMPLEY (ed.), *Paul in the Greco-Roman World. A Handbook*, Harrisburg (PA) 2003, pp. 404-428; R.M.

out etymological wordplays, that marriage is under the protection of the main deities, Hera, Eros, and Aphrodite, whom nobody should offend by overlooking or despising it²³ (XIV). His argument is like that of Chrysippus, who prescribed to the wise man to marry in order not to offend Zeus Γαμήλιος and Γενέθλιος (SVF III 727). Seneca, who did not embrace Stoic allegoresis, polemicized against this kind of inference from traditional religion to ethics, criticizing in his *De Matrimonio* those who grounded the moral imperative of being kind and grateful in the need to avoid an offense to the Graces (*Gratiae*, Χάριτες)²⁴. A strong exhortation to marriage was no novelty in Stoicism, at least from Antipater of Tarsus onward. But Antipater exhorted men to marry in order to have one's homeland flourish (fr. 63), although he also mentions *en passant* that this will provide people who will venerate the gods, whereas Musonius seems to be the only one who insists so much on the theological foundation of marriage. On the very same basis Musonius condemns the killing of babies both before and after their birth (XVa), defining their exposure or elimination as an act of impiety (ἀνόσιον, XVb) that transgresses human and divine laws²⁵. Again, he uses a theological point for his ethical argument: those who give up raising their own babies and abandon or kill them, go against the πατροῦοι θεοί and Ὁμόγνιος Zeus: and whoever sins against the gods is ἀσεβής (XVa). Hierocles, *ap. Stob. Anth.* 75, 14; III, p. 72, 4 Mein., too observed that couples should “rear all, or at least most, of those that have been begotten”, for this is “in accord with nature”, but he did not use the theological argument, and, moreover, Musonius is more radical in claiming that *all* little ones ought to be raised, and in opposing not only exposures and abortions, but even contraception.

According to Musonius, the most important element in a household is concord: the goal of marriage is certainly procreation – to the point that he

THORSTEINSSON, *Paul and Roman Stoicism: Romans 12 and Contemporary Stoic Ethics*, «Journal for the Study of the New Testament», 29 (2006), pp. 139-161; T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, *Paul's Stoicizing Politics in Romans 12-13: The Role of the Argument*, «Journal for the Study of the New Testament», 29 (2006), pp. 163-172; F. BRENK, “We Are of His Race”. *Paul and the Philosophy of His Time*, and “Deum... comitari”: *Rhetoric and Progress in Virtue*, in ID., *With Unperfumed Voice. Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background*, Stuttgart 2007, pp. 402-440 and 441-469.

²³ I. RAMELLI, *La concezione di Giove negli Stoici romani*, «Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo», 131 (1997), pp. 293-320.

²⁴ See EAD., *Allegoria*, I, *L'età classica*, Milano 2004, ch. VI.

²⁵ While arguing, soon after, that brothers are better than richness because they give help rather than needing it, Musonius takes over a passage from Xenophon (*Mem.* II 3,2), who also treated the ethical theme of household.

allows intercourse only between spouses and exclusively for the sake of begetting babies, regarding all other unions, even within a marriage, as an illegitimate seeking after ψιλὴ ἡδονή (XII)²⁶ –, but procreation *per se* could occur also outside marriage, as in the case of animals (XIIIa), just as Socrates already observed in Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.3-4 (cfr. *Oec.* 7, 11), and it is not the only scope of it²⁷. Even in the opening definition in XIIIa, βίου κοινωνία comes before procreation: “The most important thing in a marriage is the sharing of life and procreation of children”, and a little further Musonius places again the sharing of life (συμβίωσις) and reciprocal care (κηδεμονία) before the begetting of children. For Musonius, probably also recalling Socrates’ emphasis on the importance of φιλία in a marriage (Xen. *Hier.* III 3, 5), sees κοινωνία and ὁμόνοια (XIIIb) as the principal element in a marriage²⁸, which is conceived of as a common pursuit of virtue on the part of both spouses²⁹. Now, virtue is nothing but the true good, not simply a preferable, and a marriage that leads to it seems no longer to pertain only to the preferable indifferents that are to be selected (ἐκλέγεσθαι), but would appear to acquire an aspect of the true good, which is to be chosen (αἰρεῖν) for its own sake, just as the Old Stoics advised that one must choose a friend. According to Musonius, ἀρετή, or at least a good disposition to it, in the soul, together with physical health (XIIIb), is a primary criterion in the choice of a wife, and of a husband as well. Notably, Musonius seems to imply that a woman too should choose her husband, whereas Ischomachus, the typical good husband according to the current mentality – although not according to Socrates – in Xen. *Oec.* 7, 2 recalls that he chose his wife for himself, and her parents chose for her. Even Antipater in his treatise *Living together with a Woman* partially preserved by Stobaeus, fr. 62 SVF III 254, exclusively spoke of a man’s choice of a wife³⁰, albeit in his treatise *On Marriage*, fr. 63 SVF III 255, he implies that a woman should not be given in marriage against her will, in that he states that the spouses ought to “reciprocate the utmost affection spontaneously [ἐκουσίως], the husband to the wife and the wife to the husband”.

Musonius sees marriage as a relationship between equals³¹, and conse-

²⁶ K.L. GACA, *The Making of Fornication*, Berkeley 2003, pp. 60, 82-86, 90-93, 113-115.

²⁷ REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 143-159.

²⁸ Reydams-Schils (*ibi*, p. 147) observes that the Roman Stoics, by distinguishing ἔρωσ and ἀφροδίσια in a marriage, can elevate the former beyond the πάθη; contrast W. STEPHENS, *Epictetus on How the Stoic Sage Loves*, «Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy», 14 (1996), pp. 193-210, in part. p. 196.

²⁹ R. LAURENTI, *La virtù in Musonio*, «Sophia», 35 (1967), pp. 300-317.

³⁰ See REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 67-68.

³¹ See D. ENGEL, *The Gender Egalitarianism of Musonius Rufus*, «Ancient Philosophy», 20 (2000), pp. 377-391.

quently applies the imperative of conjugal chastity and fidelity not only to wives but also to husbands: a man endowed with σωφροσύνη should never admit of any intercourse with a courtesan, or a free woman outside marriage, or a slave. Just as it would seem inadmissible that a woman, either married or unmarried, should have intercourse with a slave of hers, so is it inadmissible that a man may have intercourse with a slave of his (XII).

In line with this ethical framework is Musonius' claim that daughters should be educated in exactly the same way as sons were (IV): in his view, women too should cultivate philosophy just like men – a conviction that is ascribed by Lactantius, *Inst.* III 25, to the Stoics in general –, because the *logos* is the same in both genders, and virtue ought to be pursued by both: in *Diatribes* III Musonius claims that both genders have the same *logos* and the same intrinsic disposition to virtue. Thus, in *Diatribes* IV he states that all virtues are equally good for both men and women, and belong to both genders in the same way, just as already Antisthenes maintained (Diog. Laërt. VI 12). And in Diogenes Laertius' list of the writings of Cleanthes there is a treatise entitled *Virtue is the same for men and women*³². Musonius exemplifies his claim through the four cardinal virtues, going against traditional prejudice especially in the case of courage: he asserts that ἀνδρεία is not at all a prerogative of ἄνδρες, but it belongs to women as well (here, too, he may remember Socrates' claim in Xen. *Symp.* II 12, that ἀνδρεία is present in women as well because it is teachable, in sharp contrast to Ischomachus' assumption in *Oec.* VII 25, that the god has pro-

³² ASPASIU, *In Arist. Eth. Nic.* 177, cites some "Socratics" on the absence of a difference between a man's and a woman's virtue: "Some deny that there is one virtue for a father and another for a son, or one for a husband and another for a wife. It suffices to test the argument in the case of husband and wife, for the same things are to be said about a father and a son. They, and above all the Socratics, question the view in the following way. – Is it, then, right that the husband be just, but the wife unjust? – No indeed. – What then? That the husband be temperate, and the wife be dissolute? – Not this, either. Proceeding thus by way of each virtue, and supposing that it is necessary for a husband and wife to have all the virtues, they conclude that there is the same virtue for a husband and a wife. What, then, is to be said against these things? One may begin with the one who rules and the one who is ruled, for if the virtue of the one who rules is in ruling rightly, and that of the one who is ruled in being ruled rightly, here there would not be the same virtue for the one who rules and the one who is ruled. And in fact it is a vice on the part of one who is ruled if he does the things proper to one who rules, and a vice on the part of one who rules if he does the things proper to one who is ruled. ... If there is one virtue for one who rules, and another for one who is ruled (in all the above-mentioned associations there are those who rule and those who are ruled, for a father rules, but his sons are ruled, and a husband rules, but his wife is ruled), there would be a different virtue for each of these" (transl. D. KONSTAN, *Aspasius On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, Ithaca 2006, pp. 177-178).

vided men with far more courage than women). Even ἀλκή, valor in arms, may be found among women, as the case of the Amazons shows: it is simply a matter of training.

On the practical plane, however, his message does not appear too revolutionary, in that the philosophical education of a woman mainly served to reinforce her traditional virtues, as scholars such as Wöhrle and Nussbaum³³ and, most recently, Berrino³⁴ have pointed out. The last, who traces back to the Cynics the theme of the same ἀρετή for both men and women – indeed, traces of Cynicism are apparent in Musonius and have been pointed out by scholars –, somehow limits the implications of Musonius' "egalitarianism", inspired not only by Socrates and the Stoics, but also, I would like to remark, very likely owing something as well to the Etruscan culture to which he belonged, where women were given more consideration than in the Greco-Roman world³⁵. If Musonius granted the same kind of capacity for virtue to women, and thus argued that they had to be educated in the very same way as men, he simply aimed at preparing them to be better wives, mothers, and household managers. After all, in a society like that, it would have been hard to imagine different roles for them. Also, I would like to observe that at the end of *Diatribes* X Musonius seems to challenge the traditional assumption that men are better than women, endowed with more self-control, and more capable of commanding and governing, and thus worthy of being the superior partner in a household (which in the early imperial age could be very complex, with a number of slaves, who formed families in turn³⁶). Musonius replies that, if

³³ G. WÖHRLE, *Wenn Frauen Platons Staat lesen*, «Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft», 26 (2002), pp. 135-143; M. NUSSBAUM, *Musonius Enemy of Double Standards for Men and Women?*, in K. POLLMANN (ed.), *Double Standards in the Ancient... World*, Göttingen 2000, pp. 221-246; M. NUSSBAUM, *The Incomplete Feminism of Musonius*, in M. NUSSBAUM - J. SIHVOLA (eds.), *The Sleep of Reason*, Chicago 2002, pp. 283-326.

³⁴ N.F. BERRINO, *Mulier potens: realtà femminili nel mondo antico*, Galatina 2006, ch. 1.2.

³⁵ See RAMELLI, *La concezione di Giove*; EAD., *Musonio Rufo: Diatribe*; EAD., *Cultura e religione etrusca nel mondo romano*, Alessandria 2003, to which I add HORACE, *Odes* II 18, 7-8: *Non ebur neque aureum / mea renidet in domo lacunar... / nec Laconicas mihi / trahunt honestae purpuras clientae*. Since the addressee of this ode probably is the Etruscan Maecenas, the presence of noble women as clients in full dress at his morning receptions seems to constitute an Etruscan trait: Romans usually accepted only men clients. See R.G.M. NISBET - M. HUBBARD, *A Commentary on Horace, Odes, Book II*, Oxford 1978, pp. 295-297, cfr. 289 for their view that Maecenas is implied as the addressee and continued from II 17 on into this poem.

³⁶ K. HASEGAWA, *The Familia Urbana during the Early Empire. A Study of Columbaria Inscriptions*, Oxford 2005, esp. pp. 62-72 on servile families.

men aspire to govern women and dominate them, they must also demonstrate that they are really better, *i.e.* endowed with more self-control and virtue: but if they turn out to be endowed with less virtue, they are surely worse. In this case they cannot pretend to be superior to women and be the dominating partner in a household.

Moreover, the division of household tasks between a wife and a husband is considered by Musonius as merely instrumental, depending not on superior or inferior capacities, but simply on physical vigor. Thus, he claims that, according to physical conditions, necessity or circumstances, men can do lighter jobs as well, traditionally considered to be feminine, and women can do heavier jobs, traditionally considered masculine (IV), whereas the traditional divisions of tasks into feminine, to be accomplished at home, and masculine, to be done outside, is well depicted by Ischomachus in *Xen. Oec.* 7, 18-23 and 30-31, on the assumption that women are physically weak by nature, an assumption that tended to involve also moral weakness by nature. Furthermore, soon after Musonius affirms that the activities leading to virtue are equally good for both genders, always.

Two major Roman Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus did not think very differently, although they seem to be less committed to egalitarianism between the two main members of a household. Epictetus, like Hierocles, regards marriage as a “preferable” (*Diss.* III 22, 67 etc.)³⁷. Seneca, just like Musonius, condemned homoeroticism, considered by Musonius to be against nature, and extolled married love (*Ep.* 116, 5; 123, 15). Epictetus, Musonius’ disciple³⁸, agreed with him that intercourse should be allowed only between spouses and, even in that case, only for the sake of procreation (*Diss.* III 7, 21; *cfr.* II 18, 15-18; III 21, 13)³⁹.

Wöhrle has argued that Epictetus and Seneca too, like Musonius, endeavored to integrate women’s traditional role into Stoic ethics, which did not mean a significant social improvement for them or an increase of their importance within the household, not to speak of an improvement in the social and political world. While Torre⁴⁰ maintains that Seneca played a significant role in the Stoic trend toward the integration of marriage into the virtuous life, Reydam-Schils⁴¹ stresses some of the less felicitous aspects of

³⁷ See B. INWOOD, *L’oikeiosis sociale chez Épictète*, in K.A. ALGRA - P.W. VAN DER HORST - D.T. RUNIA (eds.), *Polyhistor: Studies J. Mansfeld*, Leiden 1996, pp. 243-264.

³⁸ R. LAURENTI, *Musonio e Epitteto*, «Sophia», 34 (1966), pp. 317-335.

³⁹ S. BARTSCH, *Eros and the Roman Philosopher*, in S. BARTSCH - T. BARTSCHERER (eds.), *Erotikon. Essays on Eros, Ancient and Modern*, Chicago 2005, pp. 59-83, in part. p. 69.

⁴⁰ C. TORRE, *Il matrimonio del sapiens. Ricerche sul De matrimonio di Seneca*, Genova 2000, pp. 19-76.

⁴¹ REYDAMS-SCHILS, *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 167-175.

his thought in this respect, such as the claim that women are weaker than men not only from the physical point of view, but also from the moral one, in that he maintains that they are more prone to passions. At the same time, she also recognizes that what emerges from the scene of Seneca's death in Tacitus – which is reminiscent of that of Socrates' death in Plato's *Phaedo* – is quite different: Paulina is represented as equal to Seneca in respect to virtue, and is treated by him with the same respect and regard reserved by philosophers to friends. Seneca, as Reydams-Schils concludes, recognized women's capacity for virtue, yet saw it as accompanied by "feminine weakness". However, I would like to point out that Seneca himself in *Dial.* VI 16, 1 seems to go much in the same direction as Musonius, when he recognizes in women both the same vigor and the same disposition to virtue that are in men: "Who could ever maintain that Nature behaves in a hostile way with women's innate capacities, and limits their virtue? Believe me, they have a vigor that is equal to ours, and an equal disposition to pursue what is good, as well, if only they want to". Moreover, just like Musonius in *Diatribes* XII, Seneca too, in *Ep.* 94, 26, requires fidelity and chastity of both spouses, in complete reciprocity: the wife cannot have a lover, but neither can the husband.

As Gretchen Reydams-Schils has argued⁴², to my mind in a convincing way, the Roman Stoics tended to treat marriage on the same level as friendship between wise men and to regard it as a school of virtue. This seems to me to owe much to the abovementioned evaluation of *προκοπή* introduced by Panaetius⁴³. Thus, marriage becomes an important task in which the wise, or rather the *proficiens*, must engage with the same commitment as that which he puts into friendship with other virtuous men, a relationship of *φιλία* in the fullest sense, where both spouses share the pursuit of the philosophical life. This, in my view, was made possible by the very conception of philosophy as centered on – although not exclusively consisting in – ethics and virtue, maintained by the Roman Stoics and with particular stress by Musonius⁴⁴. That for

⁴² *Ibi*, pp. 115-176.

⁴³ In addition to the cited monograph by Roskam, see e.g. J. RIST, *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969, p. 197; A. LONG - D. SEDLEY, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, I, Cambridge 1987, p. 427; F. ALESSE, *Panezio di Rodi e la tradizione stoica*, Napoli 1994, p. 19; E. VIMERCATI, *Il Medio stoicismo di Panezio*, Milano 2004, p. 160ff.; J. FITZGERALD (ed.), *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, Abingdon - New York 2008, with my review forthcoming in the «Anzeiger für die Altertumswissenschaft».

⁴⁴ See RAMELLI, *Musonio Rufo*, introduction. This of course does not mean that e.g. in Epictetus, or in Cornutus, or in Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones*, there was no interest, say, in logic or physics. See also J. SELLARS, *Stoic Practical Philosophy in the Imperial Period*, in R. SORABJI - R.W. SHARPLES (eds.), *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC-200AD*, London 2007, pp. 115-140.

the Stoics the goal of marriage is friendship, rather than intercourse, is also stressed by Martha Nussbaum⁴⁵, who points out the highly ethical character of the Stoics' and the Hellenistic philosophers' treatment of love⁴⁶.

In this respect, the Roman Stoics' view proves to have been quite influential upon early Christian philosophers who were well steeped in Stoic and Platonic thought, such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who, together with Justin, are the initiators of Patristic philosophy.

Clement's views concerning household and marriage (especially in *Strom.* III 7, 57-110) are opposed to those of the Gnostics⁴⁷, against whom Origen too waged a strong polemic⁴⁸. Clement, unlike Tatian and currents such as encratism⁴⁹, does not condemn marriage in the least, although he, following Paul, regards virginity as the best condition (yet, he was convinced that even Paul was married, but that he and the other apostles lived with their wives as with sisters)⁵⁰; rather, he considers marriage to be instituted by God, provided that it is lived chastely and that its goal is procreation, not pleasure and passion⁵¹. Buell has argued that Clement of Alexandria's thought and imagery concerning family and procreation also depends on Philo⁵², which indeed is not unlikely, given the excellent

⁴⁵ *Eros and Ethical Norms: Philosophers Respond to a Cultural Dilemma*, in NUSSBAUM - SIHVOLA (eds.), *The Sleep of Reason*, pp. 55-94.

⁴⁶ We may compare the description of the Epicurean couple in Statius' *Silvae* II 2 [*Villa Surrentina Pollii Felicis*], 154-145 (*sic*): *Non ulla deo meliore cohaerent / pectora, non alias docuit concordia mentes. / discite securi, quorum de pectore mixtae / in longum coiere faces sanctusque pudicae / servat amicitiae leges amor. ite per annos / saeculaeque et priscae titulos praecedite famae*, discussed by D. KONSTAN, *Friendship in Classical World*, Cambridge 1997, p. 146.

⁴⁷ Of course a proviso is needed on the very definition of Gnosticism: see at least K.L. KING, *What is Gnosticism?*, Cambridge (MA) - London 2003.

⁴⁸ It even led to his fundamental conception of apokatastasis: see I. RAMELLI, *La coerenza della soteriologia origeniana: dalla polemica contro il determinismo gnostico all'universale restaurazione escatologica*, in *Pagani e cristiani alla ricerca della salvezza*, Roma 2006, pp. 661-688, and EAD., *Gregorio di Nissa. Sull'anima e la resurrezione*, Milano 2007, integrative essay on the apokatastasis in Origen and Gregory.

⁴⁹ J.A. KELHOFFER, *Early Christian Ascetic Practices and Biblical Interpretation: The Witnesses of Galen and Tatian*, in J. FOTOPoulos (ed.), *The New Testament and Early Christian Literature in Greco-Roman Context: Studies D.E. Aune*, Leiden 2006, ch. 5.4.

⁵⁰ See W.A. MEEKS - J. FITZGERALD (eds.), *The Writings of St Paul*, New York - London 2007², p. 213.

⁵¹ F. DRACZKOWSKI, *Die Heiligkeit von Ehe und Familie nach Klemens von Alexandrien*, «Vox Patrum», 5 (1985), pp. 95-125; GACA, *The Making*, ch. 9 concerning Clement's conception of conjugal chastity.

⁵² D.K. BUELL, *The Making of the Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy*, Princeton 1999, pp. 57-60: she shows that above all Philo's agricultural imagery for procreation inspired Clement's own metaphors for procreation.

knowledge that Clement had of Philo's writings⁵³, just like Origen⁵⁴ and other followers of Origen such as Gregory of Nyssa⁵⁵. On the other hand, Eric Osborn⁵⁶ has rightly called attention to the fact that knowledge and abundant quotations of Philo in Clement's *Στροματεῖς* – where, indeed, Merino Rodríguez⁵⁷ could point out more than one hundred Philonic derivations in books 4-5 alone, and almost two hundreds in books 2-3! – and other works do not necessarily demonstrate a strong influence of Philo on Clement's thought, since Clement re-contextualizes Philo's passages into his own theoretical framework.

Clement relied on Stoicism – which in turn was influential upon Philo –, and in particular on Musonius, from whose works he quotes lengthy passages above all in his *Paedagogus* and *Stromateis*⁵⁸, but not only this: he

⁵³ J.C.M. VAN WINDEN, *Quotations from Philo in Clement of Alexandria's Protrepticus*, «Vigiliae Christianae», 32 (1978), pp. 208-213; A. VAN DEN HOEK, *Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo in the Stromateis*, Leiden 1988; EAD., *How Alexandrian Was Clement of Alexandria?*, «Heythrop Journal», 31 (1990), pp. 179-194; EAD., *Techniques of Quotation in Clement of Alexandria*, «Vigiliae Christianae», 50 (1996), pp. 223-242, part. pp. 232-233; EAD., *The Catechetical School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its Philonic Heritage*, «Harvard Theological Review», 90 (1997), pp. 59-87; RUNIA, *Philo in Early Christian Literature*, pp. 132-156; ID., *Why Does Clement of Alexandria Call Philo 'The Pythagorean'?*, «Vigiliae Christianae», 49 (1995), pp. 1-22; A. DINAN, *The Mystery of Play*, «Studia Philonica Annual», 19 (2007), pp. 59-80, on *Paed.* I 5, 21-22 conflating two Philonic passages.

⁵⁴ R.M. BERCHMAN, *From Philo to Origen. Middle Platonism in Transition*, Chico (CA) 1984; C. BLÖNNIGEN, *Die griechische Ursprung der jüdisch-hellenistischen Allegorese und ihre Rezeption in der alexandrinischen Patristik*, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, pp. 205-265; D.T. RUNIA, *Philo in Early Christian Literature*, Assen 1993, pp. 134-135, 157-183; A. VAN DEN HOEK, *Philo and Origen: A Descriptive Catalogue of Their Relationship*, «Studia Philonica Annual», 12 (2000), pp. 44-121; H.G. THÜMMEL, *Philon und Origenes*, in L. PERRONE (ed.), *Origeniana VIII*, Leuven 2003, pp. 275-286; for a single aspect, K.J. TORJESEN, *The Alexandrian Tradition of the Inspired Interpreter*, in PERRONE (ed.), *Origeniana VIII*, pp. 287-299.

⁵⁵ For Gregory see my *Philosophical Allegoresis of Scripture in Philo and its Legacy in Gregory of Nyssa*, originally presented as a lecture at the Conference *Ratio Religionis. Religiöse Philosophie und philosophische Religion in der frühen Kaiserzeit. Philon von Alexandrien im Gespräch*, Göttingen, 21-23.VIII.2007, forthcoming in «The Studia Philonica Annual», 20 (2008) in an expanded version, also for documentation on the presence of Philo, through Origen, in other Origenists such as Eusebius.

⁵⁶ E.F. OSBORN, *Philo and Clement: Citation and Influence*, in N. EL-KHOURY - H. CROUZEL - R. REINHARDT (eds.), *Lebendige Überlieferung*, Beirut 1992, pp. 228-243; E.F. OSBORN, *Philo and Clement. Quiet Conversion and Noetic Exegesis*, «Studia Philonica Annual», 10 (1998), pp. 108-124; ID., *Clement of Alexandria*, Cambridge 2005, ch. I.4.

⁵⁷ M. MERINO RODRÍGUEZ, *Clemente de Alejandría: Stromata II-III*, Madrid 1998; *IV-V*, Madrid 2003.

⁵⁸ See J.M. BLÁZQUEZ, *El uso del pensamiento de la filosofía griega en el Pedagogo de Clemente de Alejandría*, «Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia», 3 (1994), p. 59ff.; I. RAMELLI, *Dio*

retains the very same ideas. He does not re-contextualize his substantial quotations and borrowings from Musonius, whom Clement deeply appreciated and who was already appreciated by Justin, who regarded him as a martyr of the Logos (2Ap. 8, 1), and will be respected also by Clement's disciple, Origen, who mentions Musonius together with Socrates as an "example of irreprehensible life" (CC III 66). Clement shares with Musonius, and also with Seneca⁵⁹, the basic assumption that intercourse should take place only between spouses and should be aimed exclusively at procreation. As Gaca has observed, this conception has its roots in the philosophical tradition of the Pythagoreans. In this connection, I may remark that the Pythagorean Sextus is precisely in line with this view when in *Sent.* 231-232E he maintains that "every ἀκόλαστος is the lover of his own wife [instead of being her husband]: do nothing for mere pleasure [ψιλῆ ἡδονῆ]". In this, Clement agrees with Musonius and proves to be even more severe than Philo (although not so opposed to the spousal union as Tatian and the encratites were)⁶⁰. In *Paed.* II 10, 42 he closely echoes Musonius, even to the point of clear verbal borrowings: "Mere pleasure [ψιλῆ ἡδονή], even in case it should be achieved within a marriage [ἐν γάμῳ], is illegitimate [παράνομος], unjust [ἄδικος], and irrational". Compare Musonius' *Diatribē* XII: "The only kinds of intercourse that should be considered just [δίκαια] are those occurring within a marriage [ἐν γάμῳ] and aiming at the begetting of babies, in that they are also legitimate [νόμιμα], whereas those which pursue mere pleasure [ἡδονὴν ψιλὴν] are unjust [ἄδικα] and illegitimate [παράνομα], even if they should occur within a marriage". Again, in *Paed.* II 10, 10 Clement verbally repeats two passages from Musonius' *Diatribē* XII concerning the equivalence of intemperance and injustice⁶¹.

This does not mean that Clement, as Gaca suggests⁶², necessarily maintained an ethical ideal of inequality of genders within a household as a reflection of a masculine conception of God. Clement's idea of God is

come padre nello Stoicismo romano al tempo della predicazione cristiana e nell'Epistola Anne, in S. CRESPO ORTIZ DE ZÁRATE - A. ALONSO ÁVILA (eds.), *Scripta Antiqua in honorem A. Montenegro Duque et J.M^a. Blázquez Martínez*, Valladolid 2002, pp. 343-351; EAD., *La tematica De matrimonio nello Stoicismo romano: alcune osservazioni*, «Ilu», 5 (2000), pp. 145-162.

⁵⁹ See I. RAMELLI, introduction and translation of Seneca's *De matrimonio* in G. REALE (a cura di), *Seneca. Tutte le opere*, Milano 2001; EAD., *La tematica De matrimonio*.

⁶⁰ According to E. FILLER, *Notes on the Concept of Woman and Marriage in Philo*, «Iyyun», 53 (2004), pp. 395-408, points out that Philo ascribed to marriage a value *per se*, beyond the goal of procreation.

⁶¹ See RAMELLI, *Musonio Rufo: Diatribē*, pp. 168-169.

⁶² GACA, *The Making*, p. 270.

clearly beyond gender, as Runia and van den Hoek have rightly pointed out on the basis of *Div.* 37, 2, where Clement allows the description of God as Mother, not only as Father (“The unspeakable part of God is Father and the part that has sympathy with us is Mother: by loving, the Father became female and the great proof of this is he whom he bore from himself”)⁶³, a notion that will be taken up by Gregory of Nyssa⁶⁴; of *Strom.* V 81, 3, where Clement refers to the bosom of God; of *Paed.* I 39 and 41-42, where God is called τροφεύς, and *ibi* I 46 where God’s breasts are mentioned, supplying the children with milk. And Clement surely recalled Musonius’ *Diatribes* IV when he entitled a section of his *Paedagogus*: “The Logos is the pedagogue of both men and women in the same way” (I 4). Just like Musonius in his *Diatribes* XIIIb, and like Hierocles in his treatise *On Marriage*, Clement too, in *Strom.* IV 621P., states that the felicity of a marriage ought to be judged only by the criterion of virtue, not of richness or beauty. He too held that men and women alike have the same capacity for virtue, a point emphasized again by another Cappadocian, Basil, e.g. in *Hom. Iul.* 241A, who also stresses the complete equality of both genders, deriving from the same φύραμα, ὁμοτίμως and ἐξ ἴσου; men even risk being inferior in εὐσέβεια (241B). Likewise, in *Hom. Ps.* 1, PG XXIX 216-217, he insists on the μία ἀρετή and φύσις μία of man and woman, their ὁμοτύπος creation, the same ἐνέργεια and the same reward for both⁶⁵.

Just as Musonius was one of the most enlightened Stoic philosophers in regard to the principle of gender “equality”, and yet, nevertheless, his ideas do not seem to have had, or even to have been intended to have, a strong impact on the improvement of women’s condition in society or a real egalitarianism, so, too, Clement and early Christianity generally did not apply, on the practical plane, Paul’s principle in Gal 3,28 that “in Christ there is no man or woman”. This is demonstrated e.g. by the “household codes” of Col and Ef, the Pastoral Epistles⁶⁶ and 1 Pt⁶⁷ in the New Testament, and by

⁶³ D.T. RUNIA, review of GACA, *The Making*: «Studia Philonica», 17 (2005), pp. 237-243, in part. p. 241; A. VAN DEN HOEK, review of H.F. HÄGG, *Clement of Alexandria and the Beginning of Christian Apophaticism*, Oxford 2006: «Vigiliae Christianae», 61 (2007), pp. 360-367, in part. p. 365.

⁶⁴ Greg. Nyss. *Hom. Cant.* 7 and 12: “If we call God ‘Mother’ or ‘Love’ we are not mistaken: for God is Love, as John stated” (1 John 4,8).

⁶⁵ For the equality of genders in the Cappadocians see V.E.F. HARRISON, *Male and Female in Cappadocian Theology*, «Journal of Theological Studies», 41 (1990), pp. 441-471; in particular on the Nyssen: M. LUDLOW, *Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (post)Modern*, Oxford 2007, pp. 163-230.

⁶⁶ On which see FITZGERALD-MEEKS, *The Writings of St Paul*, pp. 122-125, 303-318.

⁶⁷ L.M. WHITE, *From Jesus to Christianity*, San Francisco 2005, pp. 275-276, with my review: «Aevum», 81 (2007), pp. 294-299; M.Y. MACDONALD, *Can Nympha Rule This*

the subsequent exclusion of women from priesthood and hierarchy, against Gal 3,28 and the first κήρυγμα of resurrection pronounced by women⁶⁸, against the presence of women at the reception of the Pentecostal Spirit⁶⁹, and against Paul's practice of having, recognizing, and defining women both as apostles, such as Junia, and as collaborators and heads of household churches⁷⁰. Only some movements, like Gnostic groups or Montanists, pursued such ideals, so that *e.g.* Montanists regularly admitted women to the priesthood; though there are a few attestations to this even for churches that were in communion with Rome⁷¹.

Even though they don't seem to have had a close application in real life, the ideas of reciprocity, symmetry, identical capacity for virtue and a certain "equality" in spousal relations and in the household in the early imperial age are probably reflected in some Greek novels, where also some Christian ideals seem to find either echoes or, at least, significant parallels⁷². Kristina Milnor has recently argued that in the early imperial period, with the "privatization" of all citizens, the difference between men and women's roles was somewhat reduced⁷³. She sees Musonius' "egalitarian" views as an expression of this evolution (ch. 5), whereas Columella's rep-

House? The Rhetoric of Domesticity in Colossians, in W. BRAUN (ed.), *Rhetoric and Reality in Early Christianities*, Waterloo (Ont.) 2005, ch. 5, on the so-called "household code" in Col 3,18-4,1, which limits the role of women but seems to be contradicted in the very same letter by a reference to Nympha, who is the head of a household (4,15).

⁶⁸ See *e.g.* M.-L. RIGATO, *Giovanni: l'enigma il Presbitero il culto il Tempio la cristologia*, Bologna 2007, pp. 286-308.

⁶⁹ *Ibi*, pp. 51-57.

⁷⁰ There is an abundant scholarship on this: see *e.g.* G. BEATTIE, *Women and Marriage in Paul and His Early Interpreters*, London 2005; K. EHRENSPERGER, *That We May Be Mutually Encouraged: Feminism and the New Perspective in Pauline Studies*, London 2004; J. MURPHY-O'CONNOR - C. MILITELLO - M.-L. RIGATO, *Paolo e le donne*, Assisi 2006; E.J. EPP, *Junia: The First Woman Apostle*, Minneapolis 2005, with my review in «Exemplaria Classica», 11 (2007), pp. 204-212; C. OSIEK - M.Y. MACDONALD, *A Woman's Place: House Churches in Earliest Christianity*, with the collaboration of J.H. Tulloch, Minneapolis 2006, esp. chs. 3 and 9 on women head of household churches.

⁷¹ See K. MADIGAN - C. OSIEK, *Ordained Women in the Early Church*, Baltimore-London 2005, with my review in «Orpheus», 28 (2007), pp. 338-346. A continuation of this documentary history is provided by G. MACY, *The Hidden History of Women's Ordination. Female Clergy in the Medieval West*, Oxford 2008.

⁷² See I. RAMELLI, *I romanzi antichi e il Cristianesimo: contesto e contatti*, Madrid 2001; EAD., *Les vertus de la chasteté et de la piété dans les romans grecs et les vertus des chrétiens: les cas d'Achille Tatius et d'Héliodore*, in B. POUDERON (éd.), *Roman IV: Vertus, passions et vices dans le Roman grec*, Lyon 2008.

⁷³ K. MILNOR, *Gender, Domesticity, and the Age of Augustus: Inventing Private Life*, Oxford 2005, p. 185 and *passim*.

resentation of a household (*De re rustica* 11-12) is characterized by a traditional division of roles, insofar as the *vilica* preserves what the farm produces under the guidance of the *vilicus*, but these *vilicus* and *vilica* are of low social status and perhaps even slaves.

In Xenophon of Ephesus David Konstan has noticed an egalitarian flavor, which at least for this novel induces him not to accept Sophie Lalanne's thesis that the novels of the imperial age were intended to underpin and reinforce the non-egalitarian view of marriage and household typical of ancient society⁷⁴. Xenophon's novel, indeed – and probably not only this one among the Greek novels –⁷⁵, points to *φιλία*, symmetry and reciprocity between the spouses, retained from beginning to end: even *ἀνδρεία* is attributed to the heroine here, just as, subsequently, in Christian narratives such as the *Acts of Philip*. Now, exactly the same attribution of *ἀνδρεία* to women occurs in Musonius, as we have seen, and, as we shall see in a moment, in Plutarch's *Ἐρωτικός*, also in the context of a discussion concerning marriage.

The idealization of *φιλία* between the protagonists of at least some Greek novels goes together with the celebration of virtues that, especially in the novels of Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, are very close to virtues extolled by contemporary Christians – especially many apocryphal Acts, Justin, Clement – such as reciprocal fidelity, marital chastity, virginity, and piety. My own conclusion is that, from the ethical and axiological point of view, a certain evolution toward reciprocity in marriage had occurred in respect to the classical epoch, and it may even be possible to hypothesize a mutual influence between the Greek novels (their authors and public) and early Christianity. There are also allusions to Christianity in some novels, including parodic and hostile allusions in Petronius and Apuleius, but this is another issue⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ S. LALANNE, *Une éducation grecque: rites de passage et construction des genres dans le roman grec ancien*, Paris 2006; D. KONSTAN, *Le courage dans le roman grec: une comparaison avec Philon d'Alexandrie*, in *Roman IV*.

⁷⁵ D. KONSTAN, *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*, Princeton 1994, who illustrates the equivalence of the roles of the feminine and masculine protagonists in the ancient novels; ID., review of LALANNE, *Une éducation*, «Bryn Mawr Classical Review», 5th September 2006; ID., *Amor, matrimonio y amistad en la novela antigua*, «Humanitas (Coimbra)», 49 (1997), pp. 117-133.

⁷⁶ See I. RAMELLI, *Petronio e i Cristiani: allusioni al Vangelo di Marco nel Satyricon?*, «Aevum», 70 (1996), pp. 75-80; EAD., *Romanzi antichi*; EAD., *The Ancient Novels and the New Testament: Possible Contacts*, «Ancient Narrative», 5 (2005), pp. 41-68; EAD., *Indizi della conoscenza del Nuovo Testamento nei romanzieri antichi e in altri autori pagani del I sec. d.C.*, in E. DAL COVOLO - R. FUSCO (a cura di), *Il Contributo delle scienze storiche alla interpretazione del Nuovo Testamento*, Città del Vaticano 2005, pp. 146-169; EAD.,

Achilles and Heliodorus are precisely the two Greek novelists who, according to the *Suda* and the ecclesiastical historian Socrates, were also bishops. Scholars, and I myself, have noticed several elements of convergence between Achilles' novel and Christianity; e.g. a comparison between his novel and the Gospel of Mark has been proposed by Hedrick⁷⁷; Achilles even uses the Christian philosopher Bardaisan as a source⁷⁸. In Heliodorus' novel, religiosity, piety, and chastity are essential virtues; Heliodorus, like Achilles, even presents the theme of male chastity – which was appreciated in Christianity, but not in the classical world, so that Fusillo⁷⁹ considered this theme in Heliodorus to be marked by decidedly Christian hues – and that of the impiety of suicide. Françoise Létoublon⁸⁰, in analyzing the topic of chastity in the Greek novels, also notes that Achilles and Heliodorus are the novelists who most emphasized this theme. Again, an analysis of Achilles' and Heliodorus' novels induced Glen Bowersock to suppose that these novelists were influenced by Christian hagiographical accounts, where the chastity theme is particularly emphasized. They are, it is worth repeating, the only ones who are said to have been Christians – Socrates even reports that Heliodorus introduced ecclesiastical celibacy in Thessaly⁸¹ – and the only ones who place their protagonists' marriage at the end of the story, whereas in Chariton, Xenophon, and Jamblichus it takes place at the beginning, before all the vicissitudes.

The celebration of chastity in the Greek novels, starting from the I century AD, and especially in the narratives of Achilles and Heliodorus, is contemporary with the first spread of Christianity. This is, indeed, one of the aspects that seem to reveal a common ethical and spiritual atmosphere between certain Greek novels and Christianity. In the Jewish world of the I century AD the Essenes and the Therapeutae too were strongly committed

Apuleius and Christianity: The Novelist in Front of a New Religion, in *International Conference on the Ancient Novel, Lisbon, 21st-26th July 2008*, forthcoming.

⁷⁷ G. HEDRICK, *Conceiving the Narrative: Colors in Achilles Tatius and the Gospel of Mark*, in R. HOCK - J.B. CHANCE - J. BRADLEY - J. PERKINS (eds.), *Ancient Fiction and Early Christian Narrative*, Atlanta 1998, pp. 177-179, 162.

⁷⁸ Ample documentation in RAMELLI, *Les vertus*, and, for Bardaisan, EAD., *Origen and Bardaisan: Defense of Human Freewill and Apokatastasis between Edessa and Alexandria*, presented at the International Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Vienna 22-26.VII.2007, Greco-Roman World Unit, forthcoming in the «Harvard Theological Review».

⁷⁹ M. FUSILLO (tr. Th. Heinze), *Heliodoros*, 8, in *Der neue Pauly*, V, Stuttgart-Weimar 1998, pp. 289-291: 290.

⁸⁰ *Les lieux communs du roman. Stéréotypes grecs d'aventure et d'amour*, Leiden 1993, pp. 189ff., 219-220.

⁸¹ See discussion of this information in RAMELLI, *Les vertus*.

to chastity – recommended also by Paul⁸² – in the framework of a celibate and communitarian life, and Philo, *Cont.* 68, praises virgins who have lived in chastity as a result of a deliberate choice, for love of wisdom and immortal offspring, coming from the soul loved by God. I think that the appreciation of chastity also goes back, in part, to the philosophical conception of the ἐγκράτεια, especially Stoic and particularly emphasized in this connection in some Roman Stoics such as Musonius and Seneca, who regarded as the only legitimate kind of intercourse that occurring inside a marriage and exclusively for procreation, just like Clement after them.

Clement of Alexandria, like Origen and Philo, was close not only to Stoicism, but also to Middle Platonism. Seneca himself was not alien to it. Now, the Middle Platonist Plutarch – who knew the Roman Stoics very well and addressed his polemic only against the Old Stoics⁸³ – has significant views

⁸² GACA, *The Making*, Part 2 on Paul (chs. 5-6) and Philo (ch. 7). On Philo's attestations concerning Essenes and Therapeutae see L. GUSELLA, *Esseni, comunità di Qumran, Terapeuti*, «Materia Giudaica», 6 (2001), pp. 223-246; ID., *Esperienze di comunità nel Giudaismo antico*, Firenze 2003; S. BADILITA, *La communauté des Thérapeutes: une Philonopolis?*, «Adamantius», 9 (2003), pp. 67-77, who sees Philo's *De Vita Contemplativa* as an emulation of Plato's *Republic*; J. FREY, *Zur historischen Auswertung der antiken Essenerberichte*, in J. FREY - H. STEGEMANN (eds.), *Qumrankontrovers. Beiträge zu den Textfunden vom Totenmeer*, Paderborn 2003, pp. 23-56, who stresses the Essenes' interest in the eschatological interpretation of Scripture; J.E. TAYLOR, *Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria: Philo's Therapeutae Reconsidered*, Oxford 2003, who regards the Therapeutae as practicing a strong form of allegoresis. On the Therapeutae as allegorists see also D.M. HAY, *The Veiled Thoughts of the Therapeutae*, in R.M. BERCHMAN (ed.), *Mediators of the Divine*, Atlanta 1998, pp. 167-184, who also thinks that Philo did not share their ideal of equality of genders and absence of property and slavery, a view with which H. SZESNAT agrees (*Mostly Aged Virgins: Philo and the Presence of the Therapeutrides at Lake Mareotis*, «Neotestamentica», 91, 1998, pp. 191-201; cfr. J.E. TAYLOR - P.R. DAVIES, *The So-Called Therapeutae of De vita contemplativa*, «Harvard Theological Review», 91, 1998, pp. 3-24). Philo's presentation of the Therapeutae should not be considered as fictional according to P. BILDE, *The Essenes in Philo and Josephus*, in F.H. CRYER - T.L. THOMPSON (eds.), *Qumran between the Old and the New Testaments*, Sheffield 1998, pp. 32-68, O. BETZ, *The Essenes*, in W. HORBURY - W.D. DAVIES - J. STURDY (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Judaism*, III, Cambridge 1999, pp. 444-470, and M. ALEXANDRE, *The Eloquent Philosopher in Philo's De Vita Contemplativa*, «Euphrosyne», 29 (2001), pp. 319-330, while it is a fiction according to T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, *Philo's De vita contemplativa as a Philosopher's Dream*, «Journal for the Study of Judaism», 30 (1999), pp. 40-64.

⁸³ D. BABUT, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, Paris 1969; I. RAMELLI, *Il problema dell'integrazione culturale in Plutarco*, «Rivista Storica Italiana», 113 (2001), pp. 179-194; EAD., *Plutarco e il suo silenzio sui Cristiani. Per una contestualizzazione storica, filosofica, culturale*, «Sileno», 28-29 (2002-2003), pp. 95-118. MORFORD, *The Roman Philosophers*, p. 224 claims that Plutarch contested the Old Stoics and not the Neo-Stoics because, after confuting the former, he didn't need to attack the latter. This, however, seems to me to be

concerning household and marriage⁸⁴. He devoted to the subject the *Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα* (ΓΠ) where he says that the household theme is a part of philosophy (138C), and the Ἔρωτικὸς, in addition to a *Περὶ Ἐρωτος* which is preserved only in fragments (134-138 Sandbach) by Stobaeus⁸⁵, the same author who has transmitted also the ethical fragments on household and family by Musonius and Hierocles⁸⁶. Moreover, Stobaeus preserves some fragments of a writing of Plutarch entitled, *Women too must be educated*: this idea is in perfect agreement with Musonius' prescriptions in *Diatribes* IV.

Frederick Brenk⁸⁷ has placed Plutarch's *Περὶ Ἐρωτος*, a juvenile work, within the frame of other philosophical treatises *Περὶ Ἐρωτος*, beginning with those by some contemporaries or disciples of Plato, those by Aristotle and his followers, and that by Epicurus (fr. 409 Us.), who aimed at the sublimation of ἔρωτος into φιλία⁸⁸, a movement that Brenk,

at odds with the claim on p. 225 that Plutarch did approve of Stoic ethics in many of his biographies of Neo-Stoics, e.g. Cato the Younger. I find Alberto Grilli's hypothesis more convincing, that Plutarch blamed the Old Stoics (such as Zeno, Chrysippus, or the "pre-Middle-Stoic" Antipater) but not the Neo-Stoics because of the doctrinal differences between Ancient and Neo-Stoicism: A. GRILLI, *Aspetti del rapporto tra Plutarco e lo Stoicismo*, in I. GALLO (a cura di), *Aspetti dello Stoicismo e dell'Epicureismo in Plutarco*, Ferrara 1988, pp. 7-20. Plutarch criticizes no more Stoics from Panaetius onward: on the contrary, he presents many echoes from Panaetius (pp. 12, 18-19).

⁸⁴ F.E. BRENK, *All for Love: The Rhetoric of Exaggeration in Plutarch's Erotikos*, in ID., *With Unperfumed Voice. Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background*, Stuttgart 2007, pp. 84-99; R. FLACELIÈRE, *Plutarque: Dialogue sur l'Amour*, Paris 1980; M.B. CRAWFORD, *Amatorius. Plutarch's Departure from the Peri Gamou Literature*, in A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ ET AL. (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles*, Madrid 1999, pp. 288-298; J. BOULOGNE, *Trois Eros: comment Plutarque réécrit Platon*, in PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ ET AL. (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles*, pp. 215-226; F.E. BRENK, *Plutarch's Erotikos: The Drag Down Pulled Up*, «Illinois Classical Studies», 13 (1988), pp. 457-472; F. FRAZIER, *L'Erotikos: un éloge du dieu Éros? Une relecture du dialogue de Plutarque*, «Ploutarchos», 3 (2005-2006), pp. 63-102; H. GÖRGEMANN ET AL., *Plutarch. Dialog über die Liebe*, Tübingen 2006, pp. 3-188.

⁸⁵ 134-138, all from Stobaeus, in F.H. SANDBACH, *Plutarch's Moralia XV. Fragments*, Cambridge (MA) 1969, pp. 248-261; F. FRAZIER, *L'Erotikos et les fragments Sur l'amour de Stobée*, in J. RIBEIRO FERREIRA (ed.), *Os fragmentos de Plutarco e a recepção de sua obra*, Coimbra 2003, pp. 63-87; R. SCANNAPIECO, *Polemiche anti-epicuree nell'Amatorius di Plutarco e nell'Euboico di Dione di Prusa*, in A. CARAMICO ET AL. (eds.), *Aspetti del mondo classico: lettura ed interpretazione dei testi*, Napoli 2006, pp. 81-126.

⁸⁶ See my *The Neo-Stoic Hierocles in Stobaeus*.

⁸⁷ *Sliding Atoms or Supernatural Light: Plutarch's Erotikos and the "On Eros" Literatur and The Philosophical Literature Entitled "On Love" as a Background to Paul's Teaching on Love and Marriage in International Meeting of the SBL*, Vienna 22-25 July 2007, forthcoming. I am grateful to Frederick Brenk for kindly providing me with his study.

⁸⁸ G. CAMPBELL, *Lucretius on Creation and Evolution. A Commentary on De Rerum Natura V 772-110*, Oxford 2003, pp. 272-273, on 5.1019.

referring to Price⁸⁹, also sees in the Stoics, and I think correctly, in light of what I have been arguing especially for the Roman Stoics. Already Cleanthes and Chrysippus are said by Diogenes Laertius (VII 175; 130) to have written a *Περὶ Ἔρωτος*, but we know much more and we can see greater affinities with the Neo-Stoics Hierocles, Musonius, and Seneca (the last, moreover, admired Epicurus a great deal)⁹⁰. Now, precisely the final section of Plutarch's *Ἐρωτικός* deals with the transformation of ἔρως – in the fragments *Περὶ Ἔρωτος* it is characterized as *μανία, νόσος, πάθος, παρακοπή, φρονητισμός* – into *φιλία*. In this way we have a sublimation of love that is described in *Er.* 765C, with a reminiscence of Plato's *Eros ouranios* (765B), and is similar to that envisaged by Plato in his "ladder of Eros", from the initial passion to a permanent *φιλία* (ΓΠ 138F) in the context of a philosophical life, with which the married life is associated (*Er.* 751E). At the same time, Plutarch's view of the marital relation as *φιλία* is close to the line of Antipater, Hierocles, and especially Musonius. Plutarch, like Musonius, insists on the sacred character of marriage (*ἱερὰ κατὰ ζευξίς*, *Er.* 750C) and presents women as equally worthy, or more

⁸⁹ A.W. PRICE, *Plato, Zeno, and the Object of Love*, in NUSSBAUM - SIHVOLA (eds.), *The Sleep of Reason*, Chicago 2002, pp. 170-199.

⁹⁰ H. MUTSCHMANN, *Seneca und Epikur*, «Hermes», 50 (1915), pp. 321-356; A. SACHELLI, *Lineamenti epicurei nello Stoicismo di Seneca*, Genova 1925; H. SCHILDHAUER, *Seneca und Epicur*, Greifswald 1932 Diss.; C. MARCHESI, *Seneca*, Messina-Milano 1934, pp. 383-389; T. HERMES, *Epikur in den Epistulae morales Senecas*, Marburg 1951 Diss.; R. SCHOTTLAENDER, *Epikureisches bei Seneca*, «Philologus», 99 (1955), pp. 133-148 and in G. MAURACH (ed.), *Seneca als Philosoph*, Darmstadt 1975, pp. 167-184; L. CAMPESE, *Seneca e l'epicureismo*, Benevento 1960; A.L. MOTTO - R.J. CLARK, *Paradoxum Senecae. The Epicurean Stoic*, «The Classical World», 62 (1968), pp. 37-42; J.-M. ANDRÉ, *Sénèque et l'Épicurisme*, in *Actes du VIII^{ème} Congrès de l'Ass. Budé*, Paris 1969, pp. 469-480; F. LO MORO, *Seneca ed Epicuro. Memoria e religione nel De beneficiis*, «Studi Urbinati», 50 (1976), pp. 275-280; S. MASO, *Il problema dell'Epicureismo nell'Ep. 33 di Seneca*, «Atti dell'Istituto Veneto», 138 (1979-1980), pp. 573-589; K. BRINGMANN, *Seneca's Apokolokyntosis: Ein Forschungsbericht 1959-1982*, in *ANRW*, II.32.2 (1985), pp. 885-914; 885-888; A. SETAIOLI, *Seneca e i Greci: citazioni e traduzioni nelle opere filosofiche*, Bologna 1988, pp. 171-248; H. FREISE, *Die Bedeutung der Epikur-Zitate in den Schriften Senecas*, «Gymnasium», 96 (1989), pp. 532-556; G. MAZZOLI, *Le Epistulae morales ad Lucilium di Seneca*, in *ANRW*, II.36.3 (1989), pp. 1853-1877; A. OBSTOJ, *Seneca und Epikur*, Hannover 1989 Diss.; J.M. RIST, *Seneca and Stoic Orthodoxy*, in *ANRW*, II.36.3 (1989), pp. 993-1012; U. CRISCUOLO, *Aspetti della polemica antiepicurea nel tardoantico*, in *Storia, poesia e pensiero nel mondo antico*, Napoli 1994, pp. 149-167; M. GIGANTE, *Seneca in partibus Epicuri*, in S. AUDANO (a cura di), *Seneca nel bimillenario della nascita*, Pisa 1998, pp. 13-18; ID., *Conobbe Seneca l'opera di Filodemo?*, «Cronache ercolanesi», 29 (1999), pp. 5-16; I. RAMELLI, *Nostra autem conversatio in caelis est (Phil 3:20): Note su conversatio nei classici latini, nelle antiche versioni bibliche e nella patristica*, «Sileno», 31 (2005), pp. 139-158.

worthy, of love than boys, arguing that a woman's love is more lasting and superior to that of a boy – in his opposition to homoeroticism Plutarch provides a good parallel to Clement and the Christians as well –, and exalts married love (*Er.* 753C-754E; 766D-771E).

I think it very probable that Plutarch also absorbed the Roman Stoics' reflections on love and marriage as the place of a stable and enduring *φιλία*, in a mutual relationship that is regarded as a common pursuit of virtue in the framework of household life. Just like Musonius, Plutarch too in *ΓΠ* 138C maintains that the principal scope of marriage is the sharing of life (*βίου κοινωνία*) in affection and reciprocal goodwill; he indicates *φιλότης*, *ὁμοφροσύνη* and *κοινωνία* as the principal ingredients of a marriage (*Er.* 757D), which produces little *ἡδονή* but rather *τιμῆ*, *χάρις*, *ἀγάπησις* and *πίστις* increasing every day, and he even defines *ἔρως* as the most important kind of *φιλία* (*Er.* 758D). His very method of uncovering the ethical (thus philosophical!) meanings of traditional rituals concerning marriage in *ΓΠ* is perfectly in line with Stoic allegoresis, applied not only to myths, but also to rituals⁹¹, and in *Er.* 763CD he presents poets, legislators and philosophers as the sources of theology precisely according to the Stoic conception formulated by Chrysippus (*SVF* II 1009) and grounding Stoic philosophical allegoresis itself⁹². In all of the *Ἑρωτικός*, furthermore, he continues to argue for marriage on a theological basis (characteristics of *Eros* and *Aphrodite*), using the same method that was rejected by Seneca and employed by Musonius. Again like Musonius (and Hierocles and Clement), Plutarch insists that the criterion for the choice of a spouse consists in character and virtue, not in nobility or beauty (*ΓΠ* 141B), although he speaks only of the choice of a wife on the part of a man, not vice versa. Plutarch's claim that women are equally capable of faithfulness, self-control, justice and even courage and magnanimity (*Er.* 769BC) and his two examples of *ἀρετή* of women, which he puts at the end of his *Ἑρωτικός*⁹³, are much in line with Musonius' declarations concerning women's disposition to *ἀρετή*, which he says is exactly the same as men's, and even *ἀνδρεία*.

⁹¹ See RAMELLI, *Allegoria*, I, *L'età classica*, chs. 2 and 9, and *passim*; EAD., *Allegoristi dell'età classica*, Milano 2007.

⁹² See EAD., *Allegoria*, ch. 2; EAD., *L'ideale del filosofo in Dione di Prusa*, in *Dione di Prusa. Tutti i discorsi*, Milano 2008.

⁹³ BRENK, *Sliding Atoms*, suggests that at 764A-B, where Plutarch speaks of the Platonic doctrine of love, he may have intended to allude to the love of Isis for Osiris, identified with the Sun, and with the Platonic Form. His *On Isis and Osiris* was written around the same time as his *Ἑρωτικός*. Isis' love of Osiris is also similar to the great *exempla* which conclude the *Ἑρωτικός*.

A good contrast, which serves as a further argument, is given by the Neoplatonist Porphyry, whose conception of marriage is regarded as non-egalitarian by Reydams-Schils⁹⁴. Plutarch is different, even if, especially in ΓΠ, he shows traits that actually are less “egalitarian” than Musonius’ conceptions: *e.g.* in 139D he endorses the traditional assumption that “in a good household everything should be done by both spouses in concord but should show the husband’s rule and will [ἡγεμονίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν]” and in 140F he claims that the household should be considered as belonging to the husband even though the wife has contributed more to the common wealth. Rather than presenting marriage as a union of souls, he describes it only as a union of “bodies, wealth, dear ones, and slaves” (143A) and he claims that the husband ought to govern his wife as the soul governs the body (142E) and that it is the husband who should teach his wife, not vice versa (145C), otherwise she will be liable to passions as a consequence of her own nature (145E) – all things that Musonius did not preach. However, in *Er.* 767B, arguing in defense of love for women and marriage, Plutarch also admits that women have a good natural disposition for virtue (εὐφυΐα πρὸς ἀρετήν), and, not differently from Musonius, states that there is nothing terrible or strange if a wise woman governs the life of a young man (*Er.* 754D), and even suggests that if a wife is more capable than her husband, she should be the head of the household.

Thus, the investigation of the household and family theme in Roman Stoicism (especially Hierocles and Musonius), together with the discussion of recent scholarship, has allowed me to point out the close relation of this theme to the Stoic doctrine of οἰκείωσις and the development of the Stoic theory of καθήκοντα and προκοπή, the evaluation of both which began with Panaetius and his precursors (the very first Middle-Stoics or pre-Middle-Stoics, especially Antipater of Tarsus). By clarifying the development of the household conception in Roman Stoicism as compared to previous philosophical views in the Stoa, I have argued that marriage came to be seen as a communion of life tending to virtue and finally belonging to the goods, not only to the so-called preferred indifferents. A glance has been cast at the appreciation of Musonius’ ethical thought by Clement of Alexandria, who admired his family ethics, and at the gap that emerges in Roman Stoicism and early Christianity between theory and social practice. In this connection, Plutarch (belonging to Middle Platonism, to which Clement too was close, but influenced, as I

⁹⁴ *The Roman Stoics*, pp. 150ff.

showed, by the Roman Stoics' views) and the ancient novels, compared to the Neo-Stoics and Clement, as we have seen, offer quite interesting confirmations⁹⁵.

⁹⁵ Many thanks to all those who read subsequent versions of my paper and/or discussed its first presentation at the SBL Annual Meeting (San Diego, 18-21.XI.2007), Hellenistic Moral Philosophy and Early Christianity Section, especially David Armstrong, Marco Frenschkowski, Ronald Hock, David Konstan, Judith Kovacs, Carolyn Osiek, Roberto Radice, Gretchen Reydams-Schils, Johan Thom, Teun Tieleman, and Michael White.