Learning to Coordinate whit Heterogeneous Belief-Formation

digital

Articolo

Rivista

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI

Fascicolo

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI - 2005 - 3

Titolo

Learning to Coordinate whit Heterogeneous Belief-Formation

Autori

Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Carsten Krabbe Nielsen

Editore

Vita e Pensiero

Formato

Articolo |

Pdf

Online da

07-2005

Issn

0035-676X (stampa) | 1827-7918 (digitale)

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Descrizione Commenti dei lettori

Experiments show that players with identical information and objectives have heterogeneous behavior rules. We formulate how different beliefs arise from the same information and analyze how heterogeneous belief formation affects learning outcomes of two-person two-action coordination games. With heterogeneous belief formation, it is possible to generate enough diversity in actions for eventual coordination, which is impossible under the ordinary adaptive learning model. When each player uses the same function to compute a belief over time, diversity of belief formation functions within or across populations is suffcient for convergence to coordination. When players choose belief-formation functions as well as actions over time, diverse adjustment of belief-formation functions is suffcient. A risk-dominant equilibrium is more likely to emerge than a payoff-dominant equilibrium since the former is more likely to be predicted by the players.

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