JUS - 2015 - 3

Recalling Pietro Stella’s references to the thought of Ottato (320-397 a. V.), an acient well known bishop of Milevi, often mentioned by the Jansenist literature of the 16th and 17th century, it is supposed that Cavour’s famous saying “Free Church in a free State” doesn’t come either from Vinet (Ruffini) or Montalambert (Passerin d’Entrèves), but from the early 19th century Jansenist tradition to which the two ecclesiastic who had “looked after” Covour’s mother’s conversion from Calvinism to Catholicism belonged (Giuseppe Boyer and Carlo Tardi) and that, moreover, had Francesco of Sales, Camillo’s paternal grandmother’s ancestor, as “Chosen Saint”. Such a tradition had embraced and passed on Ottato’s saying “Respublica non in Ecclesia, sed Ecclesia in Republica est”, assimilated within his family by Cavour who made in the summary of his own concept about the relationship between secular and religious society.

The «unreasonable» time and the unbearable delays in adjudicating civil litigations are the worst troubles, that, nowadays, modern societies have still to face. There can be no doubt that a too late justice is finally destined to turn to an «unjust» determination of the case (or, in other words, to a substantial injustice), with heavy economic costs and wide social disadvantages. This serious problem, both in civil law systems and in common law countries, is well known ; but everywhere the best legislative attempts and efforts, in order to improve the judiciary and the proceedings’ efficiency, are too often crowned with failure. This essay tries to analyze – in a broad constitutional perspective, with special reference to spanish, portuguese and latin american systems – the strict relationship that exists between the «reasonable» time in civil trials and the «fair process» guarantees’ effectiveness.

L’Italia è un osservatorio privilegiato per confrontare il modello processuale accusatorio e quello inquisitorio poiché ha adottato un modello processuale del tutto originale. Dal 1989, infatti, è stato progressivamente introdotto nell’ordinamento italiano un modello processuale ispirato al modello adversarial: prima nella sola procedura penale e poi, nel 1999, in tutti i tipi di processo (grazie alla riforma dell’art. 111 della Costituzione). Tuttavia questo modello è stato adattato, attraverso una serie di aggiustamenti, ad una realtà per molto tempo legata ad un modello inquisitorio. Questa novità ha inciso moltissimo nella cultura giuridica ma anche nella cultura diffusa dell’Italia di questi anni poiché l’opposizione tra le parti (in Italia chiamata “contraddittorio”) viene presentata come un bene da tutelare e custodire e non più come un problema da evitare. Purtroppo, nell’ambito della esperienza giuridica concreta, il valore ad oggi attribuito al confronto tra le parti è ancora una sterile drammaturgia della controversia. Con questa ricerca si intende spiegare le ragioni che fondano la razionalità intrinseca e la forza aletica della relazione di scontro tra le parti. Essa rappresenta il cuore socratico della procedura adversary poiché genera un legame che consente il dispiegarsi di ciò che supera le pretese particolari delle parti stesse ed è comune ad ambedue: questo perché l’opposizione rappresenta non solo uno strumento logico di accertamento/espunzione della contraddizione dai loro ragionamenti, ma è la condizione affinché le tesi esposte ‘abbiano a che fare’ con la verità.

After analysing the features of the duty to reasonable accommodation, applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to religion practises, the article aims to underline that the reasonable accommodation supposes an inclusive notion of State neutrality. This notion, while imposing to State authorities an attitude of impartiality towards religious convictions, does not imply the complete exclusion of religion from the public sphere. The second part of the article focuses on the jurisprudence elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the manifestation of religious identity in the workplace. While recognising the principle of non discrimination, the Court seems really hesitant to identify a duty to accommodate in relation to religion practises. According to the thesis argued in the article, this trend is strictly linked with the principles elaborated by the Court on the State neutrality and on the religious pluralism of the public sphere. With special regard to the wearing of religious symbols the Court has been admitting some significant restrictions to the manifestation of religious identity in the public area.

The purpose of the present work is inquiring which kind of Christian judicial practice was increasing and developing during IV and V century, about matrimonial prohibition between people in relationship, in third collateral degree and inter consobrinos, so we can see that the canonical law –shown by the Church father and the Councils –, which was stabilizing himself at the time, arrived at parenetic conclusions that met the Empires’ legislation. The comparison with legal regulation, regarding the same field in IV century, enabled us to analyze the relationship between the two legislation, in order to contest the doctrine, well known during the last decades, which presumes the derivation of the imperial laws from the Cristians’ ones. This doctrine turns out not to be true, regarding, at least, prohibitions we examinated.