Formal approaches to truth share a common, undisputed assumption: the object theory—usually a portion of arithmetic—is sufficient to mimic structural properties of the intended bearers of truth. Truth is thus freely applied to natural numbers. In recent years a partial revision of this ubiquitous habit has been proposed; in this alternative framework, the theory formalizing syntactic operations and notions concerning the object language is disjoint from the object theory. Some examples of theories of truth with disentangled syntax, as well as an investigation on their logical properties, have been recently considered by the author. In this work we focus on their philosophical consequences. We will take into account the role that theories of truth with disentangled syntax play in isolating different components of the first step of our metamathematical reflection; moreover, we analyse the impact that this construction has on the debate around the alleged insubstantiality of the notion of truth advocated by deflationism.
Keywords: truth, deflationism, axiomatic theories of truth, truth bearers, conservativeness argument
In this paper we analyzed the concepts of contradiction and of contradicting itself in Severino, who says that the «contradictory content of the contradiction» must be regarded as completely non-existent, while the «contradicting itself», i.e. the fact that the subject can make a contradictory statement, must be regarded as existent. This analysis allows a comparison with the principle of non-contradiction indicated by Aristotle. The critical reflection is practiced on the concept of negation, which can not be understood in the sense of an extrinsic activity: in this case, it is the negation which presupposes the existence of what is negated, therefore also of the contradiction. It is concluded that the contradiction can not be resolved in the non-being, but the non-being must be understood as a contradiction. The latter is to be understood as the act of contradicting itself, that is as the act of transcending itself.
This paper aims to highlight the role that classical astronomy played in the construction of Aristotle’s theory of science. In Posterior Analytics the astronomical approach appears to be the main source of inspiration for the distinction between knowledge of a fact and knowledge of the reason why, on which the scientific process is grounded. According to the general ideas of Aristotelian doctrine, these two levels of knowledge, identified respectively by empirical and rational disciplines, are not separate but collaborate in collecting and explaining natural phenomena. This view seems to be a generalization of the actually adopted astronomical method in classical Greece, which was characterized by the geometrical demonstration of observed astral properties. The astronomical approach is consistent with the Aristotelian project of the apodictic treatment of appearances, since both are based on the connection between experience and rationality. Unlike geometry, classical astronomy provided a suitable model of demonstrail paradigma astronomico 93 tive science which could be successfully applied to other fields of knowledge dealing with sensitive data, as harmonics, optics and biology.
The article seeks to explicate two models of belief-assessment that appear to be operative in Hume’s essay Of Miracles and that correspond to the two parts of the striking phrase «mutual destruction». One, which we tag «Impact», treats the mutual interaction of bodies of evidence and testimony on the model of a collision between two physical objects, and seeks to calculate the resultant quantities. The other, which we tag «Overrule», operates on the quasi-judicial model of the inadmissibility of certain evidence as tainted by its provenance or by its intrinsic implausibility. The suggestion is made that the compresence of these two models may help understand why it is so hard to identify the basic argument of Hume’s essay; the question is left open of whether or not Hume has, perhaps in addition to the two models presented, any «decisive» way of providing «an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion».
Keywords: Miracle, David Hume, belief-assessment, probability, law of nature
This paper proposes an analysis of the prolusion Leibniz als Methapysiker, in which Hartmann faces with Leibniz’ metaphysics. First, it shows how Hartmann highlights the tension between the rationalistic doctrine of universals and the individuality of the single monads. Then, it will be displayed Hartmann’s reconstruction of the philosophical tradition from which Leibniz inherits this dualism; in the end, it outlines Hartmann’s synthetic solution that can, hinging on Leibniz’s intuitions, overcome this aporia. The aim of the paper is showing the possible connection between the real concatenation of the world advocated by Hartmann and the logic of continuum traceable in Leibniz’s metaphysics.
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