In this paper, I propose that the concepts of language and meaning in Aristotle have to be understood as interconnected with epistemology, ontology and politics, according to my reading of the text De Int. 16 a 3. I will try to argue that, just clarifying that all semantic relations depend on things, on the reality that caused them, we can understand to what extent Aristotle constructed a theory of language consistent with his ontological realism, with his epistemological empiricism and political conventionalism.
After a brief initial analysis of global skepticism, which includes a concise discussion of the Descartes’s, Moore’s, and Wittgenstein’s views, this article examines the conditions of the tripartite analysis of knowledge with the aim of understanding whether there is a condition that any cognitive subject does not satisfy within a skeptical hypotheses. The author focuses in particular on the justification and truth conditions and reaches a first conclusion: in contrast to what many claim, i.e., that the truth condition is not satisfied, even in a skeptical situation, the subject satisfied all three conditions of the analysis; therefore, we cannot assert that the subject does not know (almost) anything of what she believes to be knowing and global skepticism makes no sense. In the effort to provide a sense for global skepticism, the author examines the main conditions that have been proposed in order to enrich the tripartite analysis in order to resolve the Gettier problem, in the pursuit of valid conditions that are nonetheless not satisfied by a subject in a skeptical hypothesis. This pursuit leads to no positive result which warrants the conclusion that global skepticism loses any sense.
Some scholars think that Heidegger rejects the concept of adaequatio as a whole. This paper focuses on the relation between the truth as adaequatio and truth as antepredicative experience and tries to show that Heidegger does not reject the concept of adaequatio. Our aim is to outline first of all what Heidegger means with adaequatio, to show how he develops the phenomenological idea of Husserl and to prove that the concept of adaequatio is rooted into the antepredicative experience.
The aim of this article is to judge whether the apparently self-contradictory notions of Christian Epicureanism and Epicurean Christianity are useful to define Lorenzo Valla’s account of moral and religious life. The method I will employ consists of contrasting various passages from Valla’s De vero falsoque bono and from Lactantius’ Divinae Institutiones and of considering the tensions between the two authors revealing about Valla’s genuine thought. In the first part of the article I will deal with the humanist’s and the apologist’s evaluations of Stoicism and Epicureanism, while in the second I will focus on issues like the nature of virtue and the relationship between man and God. In the conclusion, I will sum up the results of my inquiry and stress the importance of Christian rhetors like Lactantius for the development of western thought.
In this paper, we expose the manner in which Hobbes’ theory about the union of political and religious power depends on certain basic philosophical tenets, as well as on his peculiar Natural Law theory, and how it has a great internal coherence. In order to do this, we will expose firstly which are the basic anthropological tenets of Thomas Hobbes, and how they necessitate his Natural Law theory, as well as his theory about the relation that obtains between God and the Natural Law. Consequently, we will expose Hobbes’ justification of the necessity of binding spiritual and temporal power together, precisely on the basis of the precedent philosophical suppositions, and how the Hobbesian theory, pertaining to the protestant tradition and showing a particular affinity with Anglican eclesiology, presents, however, some truly original features. We will consequently expose the limits Hobbes recognizes to the power of the sovereign in spiritual matters, in order to, lastly, do a brief evaluation of the coherence of Hobbesian Erastianism.
In this paper, the author seeks to propose a historico-theoretical contribution to the thought of Antonio Rosmini regarding his original doctrine on inobjectivation (inoggettivazione). The reflection is presented in three parts. The first, an introductory one, draws the ontological context where Rosmini forges his discourse on inoggetivazione. The second, more substantial, frames the conditions, nature and results of this theory. And finally, the third proposes open conclusions, with particular reference to the theme of intersubjective reciprocity, which further suggest developments on research on the philosopher from Rovereto.
The purpose of this article is twofold: on one hand it is aimed to highlight the theoretical significance of the Husserlian criticism toward the psychologistic-logical accounts according to the most contemporary interpretive proposals – through the resulting determination of what «psychologism» means from the epistemological point of view – on the other hand it is focused on the decisive role played by H. Lotze in the development of the phenomenological idea of a pure logic: this debt has not yet been sufficiently emphasized. In addition the identification of an univocal definition of «psychologism» represents a fundamental step in order to define in which way the phenomenological correlation between ideal and real realm is possible. Thematically speaking the primary function underlining the Husserlian anti-psychologism lies especially in its generative aspect dealing with the identification of the conditions of possibility of the categorial intuition and of the pure logical laws.
The aim of this article consists in analyzing Charles Taylor’s interpretation of Bernard Williams’ moral philosophy. It focuses in particular on Taylor’s volume Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (1989), but it also considers Taylor’s essay on Williams A most peculiar institution (1995) and Williams’ reply to it. The article underlines similarities (such as a common critique on morality intended as a system of obligations and its procedural matrix, or the common dislike for moral projectivism) as well as differences between the two philosophers. My argument is that Taylor’s thesis is more persuasive than Williams’ ‘sophisticated naturalism’.