RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA - 2021 - 4. Alexius Meinong and His Contemporaries

A century after the death of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), founder of the «object theory», «Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica» devotes a special issue to the theme: «Meinong and his Contemporaries». During his life, Meinong  enjoyed the same notoriety as Husserl, to whom he was commonly compared well in criticism as in appreciation; another figure often associated to him is Russell, with whom Meinong had a controversy that has been extensively  studied. However, there are many other figures of contemporary philosophers, who have dealt with Meinong’s ideas and with whom Meinong got in touch. The aim of the issue is to provide a map of the network of the relations that  involved Meinong’s philosophy, which still shows vivacity, even when Meinong’s texts are read through various perspectives and with different purposes from those of his contemporaries.

Vittorio Benussi, trained at the Meinong School in Graz, eminently represents the European scientific figure of the scholar, philosophically qualified and scientifically experienced. His work constitutes a far-reaching attempt at the  mediation between his Master’s «Gegenstandstheorie » and perceptively oriented empirical research. As a clear example of his scientific- ideational capacity, we chose the psychological-temporal problem and in particular the theme of «temporal displacement», historically framed.

The article offers a critical reading of the nine letters composing the correspondence exchanged by Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in 1915 and 1918-1920. The author explores the main contents of  the correspondence, through a chronological-thematic analysis. The letters of 1915 are eminently dedicated to a discussion of the gnoseology-ontology relationship. Here, the author focuses (1.1) on the relationship between reality  and knowledge and (1.2) on that between a priori and cognitive principles. The analysis (2) of the 1918-1920 correspondence concludes the article, engaging in the theme of the law of causality. Different in philosophical background  and argumentative style, the late Meinong and the young Hartmann find a field of dialogue that appears not lacking in consequences on the philosophical evolution of the latter.

Meinong deals with the problem of relations by addressing the empiristic theory that dates back to Locke and Hume. He tries to overcome their psychological approach by framing the relations in logical-ontological terms and by identifying in them objects of a higher order which include non existing entities. This extension of objectivity highlights – in connection with Ehrenfels’ figural qualities – the formal properties of wholes as complexes that are superior  to the sum of their parts. According to Mach, however, not every complex has such qualities: there are sets of anti-figural relations, based on sensible elements, which do not show a synthetic-holistic character and are composed  only by logical sum. Mach promotes a concept of relation that goes beyond the premises of figural qualities, by proposing a notion of relation as a mathematical function establishing a genetic link of continuity between sensations and concepts, in line with Husserl’s phenomenology.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the resemblance, remarked by Max Scheler, between his value-theory and that developed by Alexius Meinong in order to shed light on those theoretical aspects of their value-theories that effectively legitimize Scheler’s assessment that Meinong’s research on value is compatible with his own. After having briefly showed (section 1) in what representationalism consists, I move (section 2) to outline Meinong’s account of  presentation in order to stress out the cognitive function of feeling and its role in value-experience. In the third section I turn to briefly sketch out Scheler’s account of feeling in light of his criticism toward Brentano’s thesis according  to which only inner perception is endowed with evidence. I argue that the resemblance between Scheler’s and Meinong’s theories of value can be found in their attempt to overcome representationalism both by pointing out the  intertwinement between feeling and value and highlighting the immediate nature of emotional experience.

Meinong’s famous concept of assumption (Annahme) was integrated by Stout into his own work as the notion of «supposal» in 1911. This paper examines the rationale of such an explicit import into Stout’s views and reasoning.  Initially interested in the problem of error and in the non-doxastic thinking that is involved in fictions, hypothetical reasoning, as well as in thoughts about alternative possibilities, universals, and propositions, Stout incorporated the  Meinongian concept of assumption into his views as a psychic attitude fitted for accounting for such thoughts. We argue in this respect, that such an integration could occur due to a strong analogy between Meinong’s realm of objects and Stout’s universe of alternative possibilities. Meinongian assumptions were dedicated to the non-doxastic grasping of objects through «objectives» while Stoutian supposals were dedicated to the non-doxastic consideration of alternative possibilities.

This article focuses on the intellectual relationship between Meinong and Twardowski. Starting with their correspondence, it examines in what terms Twardowski’s Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen was  important for Meinong’s elaboration of his object theory. It also examines in what way some Meinongian essays stimulated in turn Twardowski’s reflections on concepts and representations. It is shown that the two philosophers  pursued common themes and theses interactively, and their respective views can be seen to overlap in some regards. These shared themes concern the well-known distinction between content and object, the notions of object,  existence and reality, the conception of intuitive and non-intuitive representations, the assumption of non-existent objects and certain theses on judgments that are extraneous to Brentano’s conception, which provided the 
philosophical background on which both of them drew.

Vienna and Graz are here related because of the Austro-German philosophical context, which pulls philosophy closer to psychology and finds true pathfinders in Brentano’s psychology from an empirical standpoint and in Külpe’s  psychology of thought. Written exchanges are considered: letters between Bühler and Meinong (1907-1920) and quotations and references by Bühler (esp. 1926-1934) concerning private Meinong communications and the Meinong  school (Ameseder, Mally). Nevertheless, Meinong is not ready to encounter Bühler’s pivotal topic, his turning point in response to the crisis in psychology, i.e. his theory of language – the valuable sign-exchange – which unifies  conflicting approaches to psychic life, and objectifies intra- and intersubjective dynamism. Meinong’s focus remains his theory of objects. Though Russell ascribes the development of his own theory of description in referential  semantics to Meinong’s problematic ontology, Russell’s empiricist assumptions prohibit that «transformation of positivism» (Lindenfeld) towards semantic and ontological pluralism, which takes place in European thought, due 
even to Meinong.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a reconstruction of the relationship between Alexius Meinong and Nicolai Hartmann. Firstly, I consider the historical aspect of the meeting based on the brief correspondence between the two philosophers. Secondly, I describe the terminology of Dasein, Sosein and Aussersein in Meinong’s theory of object. I schematically expose the Hartmann’s analysis of Sosein and Dasein. The comparison allows to outline the difference  and originality of the two philosophical projects, within which the epistemological and ontological aspects are intertwined.

According to «the emotional intentionality thesis», emotional experiences exhibit a sui generis intentional structure which consists in presenting the values of the objects they target. This paper examines the versions of this thesis put forward by Meinong and Scheler. While Meinong’s «emotional presentation account» maintains that emotions present values, Scheler’s «value-ception account» carefully distinguishes between the apprehension of value in a  feeling and the emotional response. The comparative study of both accounts is articulated around two issues central to contemporary emotion research: 1) the «epistemic question» that examines which emotional experience is in  fact responsible for the apprehension of value; and 2) the «cognitive bases question» which explores the relation between emotional experiences and the cognitive states responsible for presenting the objects targeted by the  emotions. After introducing the emotional intentionality thesis and its historical roots in Brentano (section 1), the next two sections examine in turn the versions of this thesis provided by Meinong and Scheler (sections 2 and 3). The  paper concludes by summarizing the results of the comparative study and extracting some teachings for current research (section 4).

As is well known, in On Denoting Russell charged Meinong with the accusation of erroneously taking any term grammatically sounding as a singular term as a term that refers to something. In this paper, I want to show that this  accusation is wrong. Definitely, for Meinong many, possibly most, singular terms that most philosophers would consider to be empty do refer to something. Yet for him, and for (Neo-)Meinongians more in general, given the principles  of object determination they stuck to as relevant for how one thinks of objects, it is quite possible that there are (though relatively few) empty singular terms.

Michel Foucault taught us how to reinterpret the Greco-Roman applications of the concept of parrhesia as the attempt to consider truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role, a form of criticism coming from ‘below’ and directed  towards ‘above’. The present memoir of Andrea Zanzotto shows how he voiced this role in poetry and prose. He did so to question the reader, his individual or collective audience, about the annihilation of the landscape, the  devastating counterfeiting of the environment, the subversion of the climate. He defended the land he sang about with desperate frankness.

This paper aims to discuss Crantor’s influence on Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes in order to shed light on the Academic origin of Cicero’s treatment of emotions. The main focus is the role of Crantor’s On Grief in the third book of Cicero’s Tusculanae, since this book is representative of the development of Roman consolatory tradition as well as of the influence, more or less explicit, of Crantor and, more generally, of the Academy as a centre for the pursuit of practical ethics. In the first part of this paper, I will present Cicero’s Tusculanae, book 3, as a source for the philosophical debates on emotions; then I will focus on Cicero’s references to and quotes of Crantor, and lastly on the contribution of the Consolation to Apollonius in discovering also the latent debts Cicero owes Crantor.

My aim is to highlight how much some controversial aspects of Locke’s views of the human soul may be clarified by confronting them with the thought of the Neoplatonic Henry More. Sound evidence in the Essay and elsewhere suggests that More’s theory of spiritual substances was congenial to Locke, for it represented an attractive alternative both to Cartesian dualism and Hobbes’ materialism. Locke followed More in considering self-motion, not thinking, as the proper attribute of spirits; like More, he attributed extension and motility to spiritual substances. Both More and Locke insisted on the close union between body and soul; both conceived of the soul as impenetrable by other spirits. As Jasper Reid has noted, More’s idea of spiritual substances introduced a form of «quasi materialism»; the paper suggests that Locke’s views went in this direction, although he did not follow More in attributing a natural immortality to the human soul.

This paper focuses on Thus Spoke Zarathustra’s main religious sources, especially the Persian Avesta. On the one hand, it shows how Nietzsche had a deep knowledge of the prophet Zoroaster, and, on the other hand, how the latter was considered a relevant figure in Nietzsche’s time. It turns out that there are striking correspondences between  Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and the Avesta, which also demonstrates Nietzsche’s intercultural approach to his studies, rangingfrom philosophy, religion to literature.

It can safely be argued that Plato plays a crucial, if not unique role for Hans Jonas. When pondering whether to assign the palm to Kant or to Plato in his Erinnerungen, Jonas himself admits: «With Plato [...] you have to go back a much greater distance to make him applicable to the present. But of course Plato is the greater one, the one we have to study again and again from scratch, the one we must discover, whereas we can get to know Kant thoroughly. With Plato, you’re never finished, that’s the great foundation [Grundlegung] for all of Western philosophy» (H. Jonas, Memoirs, Engl. transl. by K. Winston, ed. and annot. by C. Wiese, Brandeis University Press, Waltham [Ma] 2008, p. 263, fn. 12). Against such strong background special attention will be devoted to those passages where Jonas goes back to Plato’s Theaetetus for examining potentialities and limits of genuine knowledge, as well as the erotic aspiration of what is temporary to assimilate itself to the divine and hence to revert to the dimension of eternity.

E. Berti (a cura di), Storia della metafisica (P.D. Accendere) - E. Berti, Saggi di filosofia teoretica (R. Pozzo) - Heidegger, Hegel (L. Azzariti-Fumaroli) - M. Migliori (a cura di), Il pensiero multifocale (F. Piangerelli) - B. Pascal, Opere complete (D. Bosco) - V. Zaffino, Totum et unum (E.M. De Tommaso)